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RAPE SHIELD LAWS: SOME CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
DAVID S. RUDSTEIN*
INTRODUCTION
Traditional laws pertaining to the crime of rape have come under
increasing criticism recently as part of a larger movement to rede-
fine the role of women in American society and to eliminate sex-
based discrimination.' The manner in which society in general, and
the criminal justice system in particular, treat alleged female vic-
tims of sexual assaults has been criticized for protecting male inter-
ests rather than protecting women from sexual assault.2 Specifi-
cally, the requirement that a rape complainant's testimony be cor-
roborated by other testimony or circumstantial evidence in order to
convict the defendant3 has been attacked as being based on out-
moded assumptions and unfounded fears,' as have the rules of evi-
dence that often permit a defense attorney to delve into the private
life of the complaining witness.5 In addition, police officers who
* J.D., Northwestern University; LL.M. University of Illinois. Associate Professor of Law,
Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1. See generally B. FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963); G. GREER, THE FEMALE
EUNUCH (1970).
2. Meyer, Rape: The Victim's Point of View, 3 POLICE L.Q. 38, 38-41 (1974). See generally
S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975). E.g., Comment, Rape
and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 919, 924-26 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Rape & Rape Laws].
3. For a discussion of the rape corroboration requirement as it stood in 1972 see Note, The
Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE L.J. 1365, 1367-68 & nn.13-
18 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Repeal Not Reform].
4. E.g., BROWNMILLER, supra note 2, at 369-72; Note, The Victim in A Forcible Rape Case:
A Feminist View, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 335 (1973) [hereinafter cited as A Feminist View];
Repeal Not Reform, supra note 3.
5. E.g., BROWNMILLER, supra note 2, at 371, 386; Bohmer & Blumberg, Twice Traumatized:
The Rape Victim and the Court, 58 JUDICATURE 391, 396, 399 (1975); A Feminist View, supra
note 4, at 343-45, 351; Rape & Rape Laws, supra note 2, at 935-36, 939; Comment, The Rape
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investigate sex offenses have been criticized as being insensitive to
the emotional needs of the complainant when questioning her about
the alleged assault and for sometimes having a lascivious interest
in the details of the alleged crime.' Hospitals have been criticized
for either refusing to treat alleged rape victims at all or for making
them wait long periods of time before rendering medical aid.7 Prose-
cuting attorneys also have been criticized for failing to keep the
complainant informed of the progress of the case and for being indif-
ferent toward her and insensitive to her emotional needs.8
Apparently in response to this criticism many state legislatures
recently have enacted statutes designed to grant better treatment
to women who allegedly have been sexually assaulted. Some juris-
dictions have repealed statutes that required the testimony of a rape
complainant to be corroborated by other evidence,9 some have en-
acted statutes requiring hospitals to provide emergency treatment
to alleged rape victims,'" one jurisdiction has enacted a statute re-
Victim: A Victim of Society and the Law, 11 WILLAMETTE L.J. 36, 45-47 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Rape Victim].
6. E.g., BOSTON WOMEN'S HEALTH BOOK COLLECTIVE, OUR BODIES, OURSELVES 93 (1973);
BROWNMILLER, supra note 2, at 364-67; Meyer, supra note 2 at 39-40, 43-44; Feminist View,
supra note 4, at 348; Rape Victim, supra note 5, at 43-45. The author of the latter article
stated that certain rape complainants reported that the police made remarks such as "I know
why you got raped," and asked questions such as "How many orgasms did you have?", "How
big was he?", and "What were you thinking about while he was doing it?" She also reported
that "[olne woman said that although the rape was really bad, the police interrogation was
six times as horrible." But see Bohmer & Blumberg, supra note 5, at 396-97.
7. E.g., A Feminist View, supra note 4, at 350.
8. E.g., Bohmer & Blumberg, supra note 5, at 394, 397; Meyer, supra note 2, at 43; A
Feminist View, supra note 4, at 350.
9. E.g., 1974 Conn. Pub. Acts 74-131; 1974 Iowa Acts ch. 1271, § 2; N.Y.L. 1974, ch. 14, §
1 (as applied to forcible rape cases).
10. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111- /2, §§ 87-1 to -2 (1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.29 (Page
Supp. 1975).
Several jurisdictions have enacted statutes that prohibit a hospital or other emergency
medical facility from charging the victim of a sexual assault for a medical examination if the
examination is performed for the purpose of gathering evidence for possible prosecution. Such
costs generally are to be charged to a specified local governmental agency. CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 13961.5 (West Supp. 1976); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 507 (Supp. 1976); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.35 (Supp. 1976); NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.244 (1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.28
(Page Supp. 1975). The Illinois General Assembly has provided further that when any hospi-
tal provides emergency services under the Rape Victims Emergency Treatment Act, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 1111/2, §§ 87-1 to -9 (1975), to any rape victim or alleged rape victim who is neither
eligible to receive such services under the welfare code nor covered as to such services by
insurance, "the hospital shall furnish such service to that person without charge and shall
be entitled to be reimbursed for its costs in providing such services by the [Illinois] Depart-
ment of Public Health .... " ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/2, § 87-7 (1975). See also NEV. REV.
STAT. § 449.244 (1975) (initial emergency medical care of victim charged to county). In
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quiring health education institutions to give instruction in treating
rape victims to provide for their physical and emotional well-
being, " and another jurisdiction has enacted a statute directing the
development of community-based programs to aid victims of sexual
attacks and encouraging sensitivity training for police officers, pro-
secuting attorneys, and hospital personnel." The most prevalent
reform, however, is the enactment of statutes altering in some man-
ner the traditional rules of evidence in rape cases to limit the defen-
dant's inquiry into the past sex life of the alleged victim.'3 Although
these statutes have a meritorious goal, they appear to raise serious
constitutional questions in light of a criminal defendant's sixth
addition, the Illinois legislature enacted a statute to prohibit the exclusion of coverage for
the treatment of injuries resulting from rape in hospital service plans. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32,
§ 562a.8 (1975).
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10171 (Supp. 1976).
12. MINN. STAT. ANN. 99 241.51 to .53(Supp. 1976). See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.19
(Supp. 1976),("Sexual Assault-Emergency Treatment for Victims"); MD. ANN. CODE art.
43, § 31C (Supp. 1975) ("Transportation of Alleged Rape Victim to Approved Facility");
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 41, § 97B (Supp. 1976) ("Rape Reporting and Prosecution Units
Within Police Departments"); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 217.280 et seq. (1975) ("Assistance to Rape
Victims").
Several jurisdictions have statutes making it a criminal offense to print, publish, or broad-
cast in any instrument of mass communication the name or identity of the victim of a sexual
assault. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.03 (Supp. 1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9901 (1972); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-81 (1962). See also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520K (Supp. 1976); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2907.11 (Page Supp. 1975); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 23-32-28 (Supp. 1976).
In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), a civil action for damages against a
television reporter and a broadcasting company for publishing the name of a rape victim in
violation of a state criminal statute, the United States Supreme Court held that because the
reporter had obtained the information from the indictment of the alleged rapist, which had
been made available for his inspection by the court clerk, the freedom of the press provided
by the first and fourteenth amendments barred the state of Georgia from imposing sanctions
upon him or his employer for broadcasting the rape victim's name. The Court was careful to
point out, however, that it meant "to imply nothing about any constitutional questions which
might arise from a state policy not allowing access by the public and press to various official
records. ... Id. at 496 n.26.
13. ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.045 (Supp. 1975); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 782, 1103(2) (West Supp.
1976); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-407 (Cum. Supp. 1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 3508,
3509 (Supp. 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(2) (Supp. 1976); Hawaii H.B. 106 (enacted May
14, 1975); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 35-1-32. 5-1 to -4 (Bums 1976); IowA CODE ANN. § 782.4 (Supp.
1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:498 (West 1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (Supp.
1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.347 (Supp. 1976); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-5-503(5)
(interim Supp. 1975); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 48.069, 50.090 (1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-9-26
(Supp. 1975); N.Y. CRIM. PRO. § 60.42 (McKinney Supp. 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-
20-14 to -15 (Spec. Supp. 1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.02(D),(E),(F) (Page Supp.
1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 750 (Supp. 1975); ORE. REV. STAT. § 163.475 (1975); S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 23-44-16.1(Supp. 1976); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.13 (Supp. 1975);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.79.150 (Supp. 1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 971.31(11), 972.11, Wis.
Leg. Ser. Ch. 184 (1975).
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amendment right to confront the witnesses against him'4 and his
right to a fair trial guaranteed by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.'" This Article will examine these constitu-
tional problems."'
THE TRADITIONAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
Rape traditionally has been defined as sexual intercourse between
a male and a female, who is not his wife, forcibly and against her
will.' 7 Under this definition lack of consent is a material element of
the offense, and because the courts traditionally have concluded
that "it is more probable that an unchaste woman would assent to
. ..an act [of intercourse] than a virtuous woman,"'" it has been
14. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides, in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . .to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... " The sixth
amendment right of confrontation was held applicable to the states through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides, in part: "[Nior shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ....
16. These statutes might raise other constitutional problems, such as vagueness, see e.g.,
People v. Blackburn, 56 Cal. App. 3d 685, 128 Cal. Rptr. 864 (1976), but this Article is limited
to a discussion of the confrontation and fair trial issues.
17. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West Supp. 1976); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-1 (1975);
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02 (1974, Supp. 1975). See generally R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW
152-70 (2d ed. 1969).
Intercourse with a female who is not the wife of the perpetrator and who is unconscious or
so intoxicated, drugged, or mentally deranged or deficient that she cannot give effective
consent generally is considered either "by force and against the will of the female" or is
defined specifically as rape. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 261(1),(3),(4) (West Supp. 1976); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-1(a)(1),(2) (1975); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21.02(b)(3),(4),(7) (Supp.
1975).
In some jurisdictions the exclusion from criminal liability for acts committed by a husband
against his wife extends to the situation in which a man and woman are living together as
husband and wife. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 252(2) (1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 3103 (Spec. Pamphlet 1973); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.12 (1974).
Many jurisdictions recently have repealed their statutes dealing with forcible rape and have
replaced them with statutes that create a new offense encompassing sexual acts committed
by one person against another person, regardless of the sex of the parties, and that make
gradations in the offense, based on the presence or absence of aggravating circumstances.
E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-3-401 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1975) ("sexual assault"); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (Supp. 1976) ("sexual battery"); MIcH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.520a-
g (Supp. 1976) Laws Ann. §§ 750. 520a-("criminal sexual conduct"). For the sake of conveni-
ence, however, this Article will use the term "rape".
18. People v. Collins, 25 II1. 2d 605, 611, 186 N.E.2d 30, 33 (1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S.
942 (1963); People v. Fryman, 4 Ill. 2d 224, 229, 122 N.E.2d 573, 576 (1954). See also Brown
v. State, 50 Ala. App. 471, -, 280 So. 2d 177, 179 (1973); Woods v. People, 55 N.Y. 515,
516 (1874); Shapard v. State, 437 P.2d 565, 600-01 (Okla. Crim. App. 1967), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 826 (1968); Kaczmarzyk v. State, 228 Wis. 247, -, 280 N.W. 362, 362-63 (1938).
1976] RAPE SHIELD LAWS
held almost unanimously that a defendant accused of forcible rape
may attempt to prove, either on cross-examination or during the
presentation of his defense, the complainant's bad character 9 for
chastity"' as tending to show that the act of intercourse took place
with her consent." Nevertheless, most courts allow the defendant to
attempt to prove the complainant's bad character for chastity only
by evidence of her reputation in the community; they do not allow
him to attempt to prove the complainant's bad character for chas-
tity by opinion evidence or by evidence of particular acts of inter-
course with men other than the defendant." These restrictions on
the method of proof are justified on the basis of the opinion rule 3
and on the ground that the slight probative value of evidence of
specific acts of intercourse with other men is outweighed by the
likelihood that collateral questions relating to the specific acts
would unduly distract the jury from the main issues in the case,
consume an undue amount of time, and create the danger of unfair
surprise to the complaining witness and the prosecution. 4
Not all authorities agree, however, that the collateral conse-
quences of admitting evidence of specific acts of intercourse be-
For a discussion of the validity of this conclusion see notes 86-94 infra & accompanying
text.
19. "'Character' is a generalized description of one's disposition in respect to a general trait
such as honesty, temperance ... carefulness. Frase v. Henry, 444 F.2d 1228, 1232
(10th Cir. 1971).
20. "Chastity" refers to the abstention from unlawful sexual intercourse with a male per-
son. State v. Brionez, 188 Neb. 488, 490, 197 N.W.2d 639, 640 (1972). For married persons it
refers to the abstention from extramarital sexual intercourse. State v. Bird, 302 So. 2d 589,
592 (La. 1974).
21. 1 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 62 (3d ed. 1940); Annot., 140 A.L.R.2d 364 (1942). For some recent cases
stating this rule, see Williams v. State, 51 Ala. App. 1, 282 So. 2d 349 (1973); Crawford v.
State, 254 Ark. 253, 492 S.W.2d 900 (1973); State v. Jack, 285 So. 2d 204 (La. 1973); DeLaw-
der v. Warden, 23 Md. App. 435, 328 A.2d 76 (1974); Commonwealth v. McKay, 363 Mass.
220, 294 N.E.2d 213 (1973); People v. Whitfield, 58 Mich. App. 585, 228 N.W.2d 475 (1975);
State v. Yowell, 513 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. 1974); Shapard v. State, 437 P.2d 565 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 826 (1968).
22. See cases cited note 21 supra. See also 1 WIGMORE, supra note 21, at § 200.
23. 7 WIGMORE, supra note 21, at § 1983.
24. 1 id. § 200; Rice v. State, 35 Fla. 236, 17 So. 286 (1895); Huffman v. State, 301 So. 2d
815 (Fla. App. 1974); State v. Dipietrantonio, 152 Me. 41, 122 A.2d 414 (1956); Shatner v.
State, 43 Md. 149 (1884); Commonwealth v. McKay, 363 Mass. 220, 224 N.E.2d 213 (1973);
People v. Jackson, 3 Park. Cr. 391 (N.Y. 1857).
This rule is consistent with the general rule of evidence excluding evidence of specific acts
to prove character when character is being used as circumstantial evidence of the conduct of
the person on a particular occasion. See 1 WIGMORE, supra note 21, at §§ 193-94; C. McCoR-
MICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 186, 191 (E. Cleary ed. 1972).
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tween the complainant and men other than the defendant outweigh
the probative value of such evidence. Dean Wigmore and Justice
Cardozo argued that the better rule is to admit such evidence. Jus-
tice Cardozo stated:
A man is prosecuted for rape. His defense is that the woman
consented. He may show that her reputation for chastity is bad.
He may not show specific, even though repeated, acts of unchast-
ity with another man or other men. The one thing that any sensi-
ble trier of the facts would wish to know above all others in
estimating the truth of his defense, is held by an inflexible rule,
to be something that must be excluded from the consideration of
the jury. . . . Undoubtedly a judge should exercise a certain dis-
cretion in the admission of such evidence, should exclude it if too
remote, and should be prompt by granting a continuance or oth-
erwise obviate any hardship resulting from surprise.25
A few courts have accepted this view and have permitted the defen-
dant to attempt to prove the complainant's bad character for chast-
ity by evidence of particular acts of intercourse with other men.2"
Most courts also allow the defendant in a rape case to introduce
evidence of specific acts of sexual intercourse between himself and
the complainant.27 Although the courts generally justify the admis-
sion of this evidence on the ground that it is being used to prove the
complainant's character for chastity, Wigmore has pointed out that
in truth it is not admitted to show a general disposition to commit
acts of unchastity, but rather to show "an emotion towards the
particular defendant tending to allow him to repeat the liberty.
"2 For this purpose, according to Wigmore, the evidence is "not
only more cogent as evidence, but is not open to the objections
advanced against evidence of intercourse with third persons ... ."I,
Not all prosecutions for forcible rape, however, raise the issue of
consent. Consent is not in issue when the defendant denies that he
engaged in the act of sexual intercourse with the complainant. In
such cases it is uniformly held that the accused cannot introduce
evidence of the complainant's bad character for chastity as tending
25. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 156-57 (1928). For Wigmore's view
see note 114 infra & accompanying text.
26. E.g., People v. Shea, 125 Cal. 151, 57 P. 885 (1899); State v. Wulff, 194 Minn. 271, 260
N.W. 515 (1935); Burton v. State, 471 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); State v. Johnson,
28 Vt. 512 (1856) (only on cross-examination, not by extrinsic evidence).
27. See note 21 supra.
28. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 21, at § 200. See also 2 id. §§ 399, 402.
29. 1 id. § 200.
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to prove consent. 0 Extending this principle, several courts have
applied it when the evidence in the case clearly shows that force was
used to compel the complainant to engage in the act of intercourse
with the defendant.' Similarly, evidence of the complainant's bad
character for chastity to prove consent generally is excluded in pros-
ecutions for sexual intercourse with a girl under the statutory age
of consent,32 because in statutory rape cases consent on the part of
the victim usually does not constitute a defense, and therefore evi-
dence tending to prove consent is immaterial.33
Nevertheless, when consent is not in issue, evidence of the com-
plainant's prior lack of chastity might be admissible for some pur-
pose other than to show consent. For example, in statutory rape
cases if the previous unchastity of the victim constitutes a complete
defense to the charge or reduces the severity of the crime to a lesser
offense,34 such unchastity is material, and evidence of specific acts
of sexual intercourse engaged in by the victim prior to the time of
the alleged offense is admissible.35 In either forcible or statutory rape
30. E.g., United States v. Spoonhunter, 476 F.2d 1050 (10th Cir. 1973); State v. Settle, 111
Ariz. 394, 531 P.2d 151 (1975); People v. Schafer, 4 Cal. App. 3d 554, 84 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1970);
People v. Cox, 383 II1. 617, 50 N.E.2d 758 (1943); Esquivel v. State, 506 S.W.2d 613 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1974); State v. Sims, 30 Utah 2d 357, 517 P.2d 1315, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 970
(1974).
31. E.g., People v. Gabler, 111 Ill. App. 2d 121, 249 N.E.2d 340 (1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 971 (1970); State v. Zaccardi, 280 Minn. 291, 159 N.W.2d 108 (1968); Shapard v. State,
437 P.2d 565 (Okla. Crim. App. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 826 (1968); Hawkins v. State,
509 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Jackson v. State, 470 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Crim. App.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1067 (1972); State v. Geer, 13 Wash. App. 71, 533 P.2d 389
(1975).
32. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West Supp. 1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2018 (1972); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3122 (Spec. Pamphlet 1973); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.09 (Supp. 1976).
33. E.g., Plunkett v. State, 72 Ark. 409, 82 S.W. 845 (1904); People v. Hurlburt, 166 Cal.
App. 2d 334, 333 P.2d 82 (1958); People v. Gray, 251 Ill. 431, 96 N.E. 268 (1911); State v.
Blackburn, 136 Iowa 743, 114 N.W. 531 (1908); DeLawder v. Warden, 23 Md. App. 435, 328
A.2d 76 (1974); State v. Perry, 151 Minn. 217, 186 N.W. 310 (1922); State v. Lee, 404 S.W.2d
740 (Mo. 1966); State v. Abbott, 85 Ohio L. Abs. 257, 173 N.E.2d 726 (1960); State v. Nab,
245 Ore. 454, 421 P.2d 388 (1966); State v. Fehr, 45 S.D. 634, 189 N.W. 942 (1922).
Wigmore argued that reputation evidence should be admitted in rape cases if the woman
is under the age of consent, "not because it is logically relevant where consent is not in issue,
but because a certain type of feminine character predisposes to imaginary or false charges of
this sort and is psychologically inseparable from a tendency to make advances, and its
admissibility to discredit credibility .. .cannot in practice be distinguished from its [use
to show consent]." 1 WIGMORE, supra note 21, at § 62. See notes 161-66 infra & accompanying
text.
34. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.05 (1965, Supp. 1976); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-67 (1972);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 559.300 (1953); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-80(3) (1962).
35. E.g., Hickman v. State, 97 So. 2d 37 (Fla. App. 1957); State v. Weber, 272 Mo. 475,
199 S.W. 147 (1917).
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cases, if the prosecution attempts to substantiate the complainant's
story as to the fact of intercourse by showing that she had become
pregnant, given birth to a child, become afflicted with veneral dis-
ease, or had a ruptured hymen, the defendant may usually rebut
this by introducing evidence of the complainant's acts of sexual
intercourse with other men as tending to show that another person
might have been the father of the child or responsible for the condi-
tion of the complainant."
In addition, the credibility of a witness is always in issue. In all
rape cases in which the alleged victim testifies, evidence of specific
instances of sexual relations between her and the defendant or other
men generally is admissible to impeach her credibility or the credi-
bility of her partner or other prosecution witnesses who testify
against the defendant if the evidence tends to show the possibility
of bias or ill-will on her part toward the accused or a motive for her
to testify falsely. 7 Although the majority of courts limit impeach-
ment of a witness to evidence of bias, defects in sensory capacity,
prior inconsistent statements, conviction of a crime, or poor reputa-
tion for truth and veracity, 38 some courts allow the impeachment of
a rape complainant by evidence of her bad reputation for chastity. 9
A few of these courts also allow impeachment by evidence of partic-
ular acts of sexual intercourse engaged in by the complainant.'"
36. E.g., Shirwin v. People, 69 Ill. 55 (1873) (ruptured hymen); Harper v. State, 185 Ind.
322, 114 N.E. 4 (1916) (birth of child); State v. Bebb, 125 Iowa 494, 101 N.W. 189 (1904)
(pregnancy); State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N.W. 935 (1902) (venereal disease); State v.
Henderson, 153 Me. 364, 139 A.2d 515 (1958) (pregnancy); People v. Werner, 221 Mich. 123,
190 N.W. 652 (1922) (ruptured hymen); State v. Perry, 151 Minn. 217, 186 N.W. 310 (1922)
(birth of child); State v. Ward, 101 N.J.L. 275, 128 A. 575 (1925) (birth of child); Shapard v.
State, 437 P.2d 565 (Okla. Crim. App. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 826 (1968) (pregnancy);
State v. Nab, 245 Ore. 454, 421 P.2d 388 (1966) (ruptured hymen); State v. Johnson, 28 Vt.
512 (1856) (birth of child).
Of course, only evidence of acts of intercourse that could have caused the condition relied
upon to substantiate the complainant's story is admissible for this purpose.
37. E.g., Motley v. State, 207 Ala. 640, 93 So. 508 (1922); State v. Elijah, 206 Minn. 619,
289 N.W. 575 (1940); Shoemaker v. State, 58 Tex. Crim. App. 518, 126 S.W. 887 (1910).
38. MCCORMICK, supra note 24, at §§ 33-48. See also 3A WIGMORE, supra note 21, at §§ 923-
24 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
39. E.g., Andrews v. State, 196 Ga. 84, 26 S.E.2d 263, cert. denied, 320 U.S. 780 (1943);
Commonwealth v. McDonald, 110 Mass. 405 (1872); People v. McLean, 71 Mich. 309, 38
N.W. 917 (1888); Frank v. State, 150 Neb. 745, 35 N.W.2d 816 (1949); State v. Cox, 280 N.C.
689, 187 S.E.2d 1 (1972); State v. Pierson, 175 Wash. 650, 27 P.2d 1068 (1933).
40. E.g., Frady v. State, 212 Ga. 84, 90 S.E.2d 664 (1955); Frank v. State, 150 Neb. 745,
35 N.W.2d 816 (1949); State v. Tuttle, 28 N.C. App. 198, 220 S.E.2d 630 (1975) (only on cross-
examination of complaining witness).
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Critics of the traditional rules of evidence have pointed out that
evidence of a rape complainant's bad reputation for chastity, opin-
ion evidence of her bad character for chastity, or evidence of pre-
vious acts of sexual intercourse with the accused or with other men
can be highly embarrassing to the complainant and can have a deep
psychological effect on her41 when introduced at a public trial along
with the barbs and insinuations often made by the defense attor-
ney.42 In fact, the authors of one article concluded from their study
of several rape trials that the ordeal faced by the complaining wit-
ness often was so harrowing that it seemed as if the alleged victim
were on trial.43 Many critics of the traditional rules of evidence have
suggested that this traumatic experience is one of the reasons rape
is such an under-reported crime." Critics also have maintained that
the traditional rules of evidence are obstacles to convictions of rap-
ists because juries presented with evidence concerning a complain-
ant's past sexual history make use of such information to form a
moral judgment of her character and then are likely to be sympa-
thetic to the assailant." This, too, has been cited as a reason many
rape victims fail to report the crime to the police.46
Apparently in response to this criticism of traditional evidentiary
rules admitting evidence of the alleged victim's previous sexual con-
duct, at least twenty-three states have enacted rape shield laws that
41. E.g., Bohmer & Blumberg, supra note 5, at 395; A Feminist View, supra note 4, at 350-
51; Repeal Not Reform, supra note 3, at 1374.
42. See, e.g., Hibey, The Trial of a Rape Case: An Advocate's Analysis of Corroboration,
Consent, and Character, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 309, 323 n.48 (1973).
43. Bohmer & Blumberg, supra note 5, at 398.
44. E.g., A Feminist View, supra note 4, at 350-51; Rape & Rape Laws, supra note 2, at
920-22; Note, California Rape Evidence Reform: An Analysis of Senate Bill 1678, 26 HASTINGS
L.J. 1551, 1554 (1975) [hereinafter cited as California Rape Evidence Reform]; Rape Victim,
supra note 5, at 43.
According to the Uniform Crime Reports, forcible rape is "probably one of the most under-
reported crimes . . ." of all the Crime Index offenses. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 22 (1975). In 1967 the President's Commission
on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice estimated that the actual number of
forcible rapes exceeded the reported number by more than 350 percent. PRESIDENT'S COMMIS-
SION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE
SOCIETY 21 (1967). Other estimates of the percentage of rapes actually reported run as low as
five percent. See A Feminist View, supra note 4, at 347; Rape & Rape Laws, supra note 2, at
920-22; Repeal Not Reform, supra note 3, at 1374-75.
45. E.g., BROWNMILLER, supra note 2, at 385-86; Bohmer & Blumberg, supra note 5, at 394;
A Feminist View, supra note 4, at 343-44; Rape & Rape Laws, supra note 2, at 935-36.
46. E.g., A Feminist View, supra note 4, at 347.
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place some restrictions on the evidence that can be introduced by a
defendant charged with rape. 7 The major restriction concerns the
use of such evidence on the issue of consent. Ten statutes absolutely
prohibit the defendant from introducing for this purpose evidence
of the complaining witness's bad reputation for chastity, opinion
evidence of the complainant's past sexual conduct, or evidence of
specific acts of sexual intercourse between the complainant and
men other than the defendant." Eight other statutes prohibit the
introduction of such evidence on the issue of consent unless the trial
judge determines, after a hearing either in camera or merely outside
the presence of the jury,4" that the evidence is relevant, and under
most of the statutes, that the probative value of the evidence is not
outweighed by its prejudicial nature or, under a few of the statutes,
by some other enumerated collateral policy. 0 Two other statutes
47. See note 13 supra.
48. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1103(2) (West Supp. 1976); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3509 (Supp.
1975); IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-1-32.5-1 (Burns 1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (Supp.
1976); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-5-503(5) (interim Supp. 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-
20-14 (Spec. Supp. 1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(D) (Page Supp. 1975); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 750 (Supp. 1975) (unless the conduct took place in the presence of the defen-
dant); ORE. REV. STAT. § 163.475 (1975); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 972.11(2)(b), Wis. Leg. Ser. ch.
184 (1975).
49. If the hearing is held merely outside the presence of the jury, rather than in camera,
members of the public may be present in the courtroom as spectators.
50. ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.045 (Supp. 1975) (court must find, after an in camera hearing that
the evidence is relevant and that its probative value "is not outweighed by the probability
that its admission will create undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or unwarranted inva-
sion of the privacy of the complaining witness"; evidence of complainant's sexual conduct
occurring more than one year before date of offense charged is presumed to be inadmissible);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-407 (Supp. 1975) (court must find, after an in camera hearing,
that the evidence "is relevant to a material issue in the case"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 782.4 (Supp.
1976) (court must conduct an in camera hearing "as to the relevancy of such evidence";
previous sexual conduct of the complainant with men other than the accused is not admissi-
ble if it occurred more than one year prior to the date of the alleged crime); NEv. REV. STAT.
§ 48.069 (1975) (court must find, after a hearing outside the presence of the jury, that the
evidence is "relevant to the issue of consent," and that its probative value is not outweighed
by the danger of undue prejudice, of confusion of issues, or of misleading the jury, or by the
amount of time that would be consumed); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-9 -26 (Supp. 1975) (court
must find, after an in camera hearing, that "evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct is
material to the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its
probative value"); N.Y. CRIM. PRO. § 60.42 (McKinney Supp. 1975) (court must find, after
an offer of proof outside the hearing of the jury or "such hearing as the court may require,"
that the evidence is "relevant and admissible in the interests of justice"); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 21.13 (Supp. 1975) (court must find, after an in camera hearing, that the "evidence
is material to a fact at issue in the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does
not outweigh its probative value"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.79.150 (Supp. 1975) (court
must find, after a closed hearing outside the presence of the jury, that the evidence is "rele-
vant to the issue of the victim's consent; is not inadmissible because its probative value is
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apparently prohibit only the use of evidence of specific instances of
sexual intercourse between the complainant and men other than the
defendant on the issue of consent unless the trial judge first con-
ducts a hearing and finds the evidence admissible.' Still another
apparently absolutely excludes evidence of a rape complainant's
bad reputation for chastity and opinion evidence of her past sexual
conduct. It also prohibits the defendant from introducing evidence
of specific instances of sexual intercourse between the complaining
witness and men other than the defendant unless the acts occurred
within one year of the date of the alleged offense and tend to estab-
lish "a common scheme or plan of similar sexual conduct under
circumstances similar to the case at issue on the part of the com-
plainant." The court, after a hearing outside the presence of the
jury, must find that the evidence is "relevant and material to the
fact of consent, and is not so prejudicial as to" outweigh its proba-
tive value. 2
Evidence of previous acts of sexual intercourse between the com-
plaining witness and the defendant is prohibited in thirteen states
on the issue of consent unless the court, after a hearing held either
in camera or merely outside the presence of the jury, finds the
evidence admissible. One of these statutes merely requires the court
to determine that the evidence is of prior acts of the complaining
witness with the defendant." Under the remaining twelve statutes
the court must determine that the evidence is relevant to the issue
of consent. In addition, under most of the statutes, the court must
find that the probative value of the evidence is not outweighed by
its prejudicial nature or by some other enumerated collateral pol-
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will create a substantial dan-
ger of undue prejudice; and that its exclusion would result in denial of substantial justice to
the defendant").
51. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(2) (Supp. 1976) (court must find, after a hearing outside the
presence of the jury, that the previous sexual activity "shows such a relation to the conduct
involved in the case that it tends to establish a pattern of conduct or behavior on the part of
the victim which is relevant to the issue of consent"); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 23-44-16.1
(Supp. 1976) (court must "conduct a hearing in the absence of the jury and the public to
consider and rule upon the relevancy and materiality of the evidence. Evidence of the victim's
sexual conduct with persons other than the accused is not admissible unless relevant to a fact
at issue").
52. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.347 (Supp. 1976). The statutes of the remaining two jurisdic-
tions, Hawaii and Louisiana, do not deal with the question of evidence of the prior sexual
conduct of the complaining witness on the issue of consent.
53. MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 94-5-503(5) (interim Supp. 1975).
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icy. 4 The statutes in the remaining ten jurisdictions either expressly
exclude such evidence from the requirements or prohibitions of the
statute55 or do not cover this type of evidence when used for the
purpose of showing consent.5"
Fourteen statutes also contain restrictions on the introduction of
evidence of specific acts of sexual conduct by the complaining wit-
ness with men other than the defendant when offered to rebut evi-
dence introduced by the prosecution to substantiate the complain-
ant's story as to the fact of intercourse.57 Three of these statutes
54. ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.045 (Supp. 1975) (court must find, after an in camera hearing,
that the evidence is relevant and that its probative value "is not outweighed by the probabil-
ity that its admission will create undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or unwarranted
invasion of the privacy of the complaining witness"; evidence of the complainant's sexual
conduct occurring more than one year before the date of the offense charged is presumed to
be inadmissible); IND. STAT. ANN. § 35-1-32.5-2 (Bums 1976) (court must find, after a hearing
outside the presence of the jury, that the evidence is material to a fact at issue in the case
and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative value); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 782.4 (Supp. 1976) (court must conduct an in camera hearing "as to the rele-
vancy of such evidence"); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.720j (Supp. 1976) (court must find,
after an in camera hearing, that the evidence is "material to a fact at issue in the case and
that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative value"); MINN.
STAT. ANN. 609.347 (Supp. 1976) (court must find, after a hearing outside the presence of the
jury, that the evidence is "relevant and material to the fact of consent and is not so prejudicial
as to be inadmissible"); NEv. REV. STAT. § 48.069 (1975) (court must find, after a hearing
outside the presence of the jury, that the evidence is "relevant to the issue of consent," and
that its probative value is not outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice, of confusion of
issues, or of misleading the jury, or by the amount of time that would be consumed); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 40A-9-26 (Supp. 1975) (court must find, after an in camera hearing, that the
evidence is "material to the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not
outweigh its probative value"); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.02(D),(E) (Page Supp. 1975)
(court must find, after an in camera hearing, that "the evidence is material to a fact at issue
in the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative
value"); ORE. REV. STAT. § 163.475 (1975) (court must find, after a hearing outside the
presence of the jury, that the evidence is "relevant for the purpose offered and is not otherwise
inadmissible"); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 23-44-16.1 (Supp. 1976) (court must "conduct a
hearing in the absence of the jury and the public to consider and rule upon the relevancy and
materiality of the evidence"); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.13 (Supp. 1975) (court must find,
after an in camera hearing, that "the evidence is material to a fact at issue in the case and
that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative value"); Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 971.31(11), 972.11, Wis. Leg. Ser. ch. 184 (1975) (court must find, upon a
pretrial motion, that the evidence is "material to a fact at issue in the case and of sufficient
probative value to outweigh its inflammatory and prejudicial nature").
55. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1103(2) (West Supp. 1976); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-407 (Supp.
1975); DEl.. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3509 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. CRIM. PRO. § 60.42 (McKinney Supp.
1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-14 (Spec. Supp. 1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 750
(Supp. 1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.79.150 (Supp. 1975).
56. FIA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(2) (Supp. 1976); Hawaii H.B. 106 (enacted May 14, 1975);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:498 (West 1976).
57. See note 36 supra & accompanying text.
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apparently absolutely exclude such evidence," and the remaining
eleven apparently require that the evidence first be submitted to the
trial judge to determine its relevance at a hearing conducted either
in camera or merely outside the presence of the jury. Under most of
the statutes, the court also must find that the probative value of the
evidence is not outweighed by its prejudicial nature or by some
other enumerated collateral policy. 9
Most rape shield statutes also apply to the use of evidence of a
rape complainant's previous sexual conduct to impeach her credi-
bility as a witness. Under five of the statutes a defendant in a rape
case apparently is absolutely prohibited from using such evidence
for impeachment purposes,'" and another four make only minor ex-
ceptions."' Four of the statutes can be read to prohibit all such
58. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(2) (Supp. 1976); ORE. REV. STAT. § 163.475 (1975); WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 972.11, Wis. Leg. Ser. ch. 184 (1975).
59. ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.045 (Supp. 1975); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 35-1-32.5-2, 35-1-32.5-3
(Burns 1976); IOWA CODE ANN. § 782.4 (Supp. 1976); MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j
(Supp. 1976) (only "[elvidence of specific instances of sexual activity showing the source or
origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease" admissible); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.347 (Supp. 1976)
(only "[elvidence of specific instances of sexual activity showing the source of semen, preg-
nancy, or disease at the time of the incident or, in the case of pregnancy, between the time
of the incident and trial" admissible); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-5-503(5) (interim Supp.
1975) (only "[elvidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual activity to show the origin
of semen, pregnancy, or disease which is at issue in the prosecution" admissible); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 40A-9-26 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. CRIM. PRO. § 60.42 (McKinney Supp. 1975) (evidence
that "rebuts evidence introduced by the people which proves or tends to prove that the
accused is the cause of pregnancy or disease of the victim, or the source of semen found in
the victim" or that "rebuts evidence introduced by the people of the victim's failure to engage
in sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse or sexual contact during a given period of
time" is admissible without a hearing); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.02(D),(E) (Page Supp.
1975) (only "evidence of the origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease" admissible); S.D. CoM-
PILED LAWS ANN. § 23-44-16.1 (Supp. 1976); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.13 (Supp. 1975).
60. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 35-1-32.5-1, 35-1-32.5-2 (Supp. 1975); MICH. COmP. LAWS ANN. §
750.520j (Supp. 1976); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(D) (Page Supp. 1975); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 163.475 (1975); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.13 (Supp. 1975). Each of these statutes, except
Oregon's, in effect bars all evidence of the complainant's sexual conduct that is not "material
to a fact at issue." The author has interpreted this phrase to have been intended to exclude
from its scope the credibility of the complainant or any other witness, because credibility,
though an issue in the case, is not technically a "fact at issue."
61. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.347 (Supp. 1976) (evidence "offered to rebut specific testimony
of the complainant" is admissible if, after a hearing held outside the presence of the jury,
the court finds that the evidence is material and that its "inflammatory or prejudicial nature
does not outweigh its probative value"); NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.090 (1975) (evidence of com-
plainant's previous sexual conduct is admissible if "the prosecutor has presented evidence or
the victim has testified concerning such conduct, or absence of such conduct, in which case
the scope of the accused's cross-examination of the victim or rebuttal shall be limited to the
evidence presented by the prosecutor or victim"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.79.150 (Supp.
1975) (complainant can be cross-examined "on the issue of past sexual behavior when the
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evidence for impeachment purposes except evidence of specific in-
stances of sexual conduct between the complainant and the ac-
cused, 2 and another nine can be read to prohibit all evidence of
previous sexual conduct of the complainant for impeachment pur-
poses unless the trial judge first conducts a hearing as to its admissi-
bility." Most of these statutes also apply when evidence of the pre-
vious sexual conduct of the complainant is offered by the defendant
to impeach the credibility of a witness other than the complainant. 4
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
Chambers and Davis: Defendants' Rights To Present Evidence and
To Cross-Examine Witnesses
Rape shield statutes preclude many defendants charged with for-
cible rape from introducing certain evidence in their defense and
curtail their cross-examination of the complaining witness, and per-
haps also cross-examination of other prosecution witnesses. As indi-
cated by the United States Supreme Court in Chambers v.
prosecution presents evidence in its case in chief tending to prove the nature of the victim's
past sexual behavior," though the court first may require an in camera hearing); Wis. STAT.
ANN. §§ 971.31(11), 972.11(2)(b)(3), Wis. Leg. Ser. ch. 184 (1975) ("[elvidence of prior
untruthful allegations of sexual assault made by the complaining witness" apparently is
admissible if the court finds that its probative value outweighs its inflammatory and prejudi-
cial nature).
62. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(2) (Supp. 1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:498 (West 1976);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-5-503(5) (interim Supp. 1975) (hearing outside the presence of
the jury first must be held before evidence of past sexual conduct with defendant is admissi-
ble); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 23-44-16.1 (Supp. 1976) (hearing in the absence of the jury
and the public first must be held before evidence of sexual conduct with defendant is admissi-
ble).
63. ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.045 (Supp. 1975); CAL. EvID. CODE § 782 (West Supp. 1976); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-407 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (evidence of victim's sexual conduct with
defendant admissible without a hearing); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3508 (Supp. 1975); Hawaii
H.B. 106 (enacted May 14, 1975); IowA CODE ANN. § 782.4 (Supp. 1976) (evidence of previous
sexual conduct with men other than the defendant is inadmissible if it occurred more than
one year before date of alleged offense); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-9-26 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. CalM.
Pao. § 60.42 (McKinney Supp. 1975) (evidence of "specific instances of the victim's prior
sexual conduct with the accused" and evidence that "rebuts evidence introduced by the
people of the victim's failure to engage in sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse or
sexual contact during a given period of time" is admissible without a hearing); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-20-15 (Spec. Supp. 1975).
64. The exceptions are CAL. EviD. CODE § 782 (West Supp. 1976); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 3508 (Supp. 1975); Hawaii H.B. 106 (enacted May 14, 1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.090
(1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-15 (Spec. Supp. 1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.79.150
(Supp. 1975).
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Mississippi5 and in Davis v. Alaska, " this effect of the rape shield
laws may raise serious constitutional problems.
In Chambers the Court held that the application of two state
evidentiary rules precluding the accused from introducing evidence
in his defense and from impeaching his own witness had rendered
his trial fundamentally unfair and denied him due process of law.
Chambers, charged with murdering a police officer, attempted to
show at trial that another man, McDonald, had fired the fatal shot.
After the shooting McDonald confessed to Chambers's attorneys
that he, not Chambers, had killed the policeman, and on three
occasions he made similar confessions to friends. When called as a
defense witness at the trial, however, McDonald denied committing
the murder and recanted the prior confession he had made to Cham-
bers's attorneys. Because of the state's "voucher" rule, which pro-
hibits a party from impeaching his own witness, Chambers could
not attack McDonald's credibility, and because Mississippi did not
recognize an exception to the hearsay rule for declarations against
penal interest, Chambers was unable to introduce evidence of the
alleged out-of-court confessions made by McDonald to his friends.
The jury convicted Chambers of murder and sentenced him to life
imprisonment. The Mississippi Supreme Court upheld his convic-
tion."
On certiorari the United States Supreme Court reversed Cham-
bers's conviction. The Court prefaced its decision by enunciating
the following general principles:
The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in
essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the
State's accusations. The rights to confront and cross-examine
witnesses and to call witnesses in one's own behalf have long been
recognized as essential to due process. Mr. Justice Black . . .
identified these rights as among the minimum essentials of a fair
trial: 'A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against
him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense-a right to
his day in court-are basic in our system of jurisprudence; and
these rights include, as a minimum, a right to examine the wit-
nesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be represented by
counsel. '
65. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
66. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
67. Chambers v. State, 252 So. 2d 217 (Miss. 1972).
68. 410 U.S. at 294 (emphasis supplied). See also Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19
(1967).
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In applying these principles to the case before it, the Court first
examined the effect of the state's "voucher" rule. Stating that the
rule denied Chambers an opportunity to subject McDonald's
"damning repudiation" and alibi to cross-examination, the Court
explained that "[tihe right of cross-examination is more than a
desirable rule of trial procedure. It is implicit in the constitutional
right of confrontation, and helps assure the 'accuracy of the truth-
determining process.' "" Although recognizing that "the right to
confront and to cross-examine is not absolute and may, in appro-
priate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in
the criminal trial process,"' the Court nevertheless stated that "its
denial or significant diminution calls into question the ultimate
'integrity of the fact-finding process' and requires that the compet-
ing interest be closely examined."'" The Court concluded that the
"voucher" rule, as applied in Chambers, "plainly interfered with
Chambers' right to defend against the State's charges."7
The Court then considered Mississippi's hearsay rule, which did
not recognize an exception for declarations against penal interest.
The Court noted that the accused, in presenting witnesses in his
own behalf, must comply with the state's established rules of pro-
cedure and evidence,73 but because it found that the evidence of the
alleged out-of-court confessions made by McDonald to his friends
bore "persuasive assurances of trustworthiness"74 and that the
evidence was critical to Chambers' defense, it held that the effect
of the rule was to deprive the accused of his right to present wit-
nesses in his own defense. The Court concluded by stating that
"[iln these circumstances, where constitutional rights directly af-
fecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule
may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice."75
In Davis v. Alaska7" the defendant alleged that the application of
a state statute and a court rule aimed at preserving the confidential-
ity of juvenile adjudications of delinquency77 violated his right of
69. 410 U.S. at 295.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 298.
73. Id. at 302.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
77. ALASKA RuiE OF CHILDREN'S PROCEDURE 23 provides:
No adjudication, order, or disposition of a juvenile case shall be admissible
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confrontation. The statute and rule prevented the defendant from
impeaching the credibility of a prosecution witness by cross-
examination designed to establish possible bias because of the wit-
ness's probationary status as a juvenile delinquent. Davis was
charged with breaking into a tavern and stealing a safe containing
cash and checks. The primary evidence introduced against him at
trial was the testimony of Green, a youth who was then on probation
by order of a juvenile court after having been adjudicated a delin-
quent for committing two acts of burglary. Green identified Davis
as the man he had seen with a crowbar on the day of the burglary
near where the empty safe was subsequently discovered. On cross-
examination Davis's attorney was precluded from impeaching
Green by showing that, in reporting the incident to the police and
identifying Davis, Green might have been acting out of fear of possi-
ble probation revocation. Davis was convicted and his conviction
was affirmed by the Alaska Supreme Court."
The United States Supreme Court reversed Davis's conviction
and held that the limitation placed on the cross-examination of
Green violated the confrontation clause of the Constitution. The
Court stated that "[tihe accuracy and truthfulness of Green's tes-
timony were key elements in the State's case against petitioner,""
and found that in order to effectively cross-examine Green, Davis
had to be able to show the jury why Green might have been biased.
In reaching its result the Court rejected the State's argument that
its interest in protecting the anonymity of juvenile offenders out-
weighed any interest Davis might have had in cross-examining
Green about his probationary status. The court stated:
We do not and need not challenge the State's interest as a
matter of its own policy in the administration of criminal justice
to seek to preserve the anonymity of a juvenile offender ...
Here, however, petitioner sought to introduce evidence of Green's
probation for the purpose of suggesting that Green was biased
and, therefore, that his testimony was either not to be believed
in a court not acting in the exercise of juvenile jurisdiciton except for use in a
presentencing procedure in a criminal case where the superior court, in its
discretion, determines that such use is appropriate.
ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(g) provides, in part: "The commitment and placement of a child
and evidence given in the court are not admissible as evidence against the minor in a subse-
quent case or proceedings in any other court. .. ."
78. Davis v. State, 499 P.2d 1025 (Alas. 1972).
79. 415 U.S. at 317.
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in his identification of petitioner or at least very carefully consid-
ered in that light. Serious damage to the strength of the State's
case would have been a real possibility had petitioner been al-
lowed to pursue this line of inquiry. In this setting we conclude
that the right of confrontation is paramount to the State's policy
of protecting a juvenile offender. Whatever temporary embarrass-
ment might result to Green or his family by disclosure of his
juvenile record-if the prosecution insisted on using him to make
its case-is outweighed by petitioner's right to probe into the
influence of possible bias on the testimony of a crucial identifica-
tion witness.
[Wie conclude that the State's desire that Green fulfill his
public duty to testify free from embarrassment and with his repu-
tation unblemished must fall before the right of petitioner to seek
out the truth in the process of defending himself.
The State's policy interest in protecting the confidentiality of
a juvenile offender's record cannot require yielding of so vital a
constitutional right as the effective cross-examination for bias of
an adverse witness.
80
Together, Chambers and Davis appear to stand for the proposi-
tion that a state, through the mechanistic application of its rules of
evidence, cannot exclude trustworthy evidence critical to the de-
fense of an accused without violating his right to due process of law,
or deny or significantly curtail his cross-examiniation of a crucial
witness without violating his right of confrontation unless the defen-
dant's interest is outweighed by a legitimate competing state inter-
est in excluding the evidence or curtailing the cross-examination.
Further, the cases indicate that a state's policy interest in protect-
ing a witness from embarrassment does not outweigh a criminal
defendant's right to present evidence or confront witnesses." Be-
80. Id. at 319-20 (emphasis supplied). Cf. People v. Norwood, 54 II. 2d 253, 296 N.E.2d
852 (1973).
81. Chain bers has been applied by lower courts not only to require the admission of hearsay
statements that were against the penal interest of the declarant and that exculpated the
defendant from the crime charged, United States v. Goodlow, 500 F.2d 954 (8th Cir. 1974);
Commonwealth v. Hackett, 225 Pa. Super. Ct. 22, 307 A.2d 334 (1973), but also to require,
so that the defendant could attempt to establish his defense of entrapment, the admission of
hearsay statements made by a government informer who allegedly arranged the sale of hash-
ish for which the defendant was being tried, Kreisher v. State, 303 A. 2d 651 (Del. 1973).
Chambers also has been applied to require the admission of opinion evidence concerning the
results of a polygraph test administered to the defendant, State v. Dorsey, 87 N.M. 323, 532
P.2d 912 (Ct. App.), alf 'd, 88 N.M. 184, 539 P.2d 204 (1975). One concurring judge viewed
Chambers as requiring the admission of privileged communications between a client, de-
ceased at the time of the defendant's trial, and his attorney when the communications would
[Vol. 18:1
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cause the statutes that modify traditional rules of evidence in rape
cases can have the effect of prohibiting a defendant from introduc-
ing evidence in his defense and of limiting his cross-examination of
the complaining witness, the constitutionality of these statutes is
questionable.
Restrictions on Using Evidence of Complainant's Prior Sexual
Conduct To Show Consent
Absolute Prohibition on Evidence of Complainant's Bad
Character for Chastity
In light of Chambers and Davis, those statutes that absolutely
prohibit a defendant from introducing evidence of a rape complain-
ant's bad reputation for chastity, opinion evidence of her bad char-
acter for chastity, and evidence of specific acts of sexual intercourse
between the complainant and men other than the defendant on the
issue of consent may unconstitutionally deprive the defendant of his
rights to a fair trial and to confront the witnesses against him.
Evidence of the complainant's bad reputation for chastity, though
hearsay, is no less trustworthy as a class than any other type of
reputation evidence used to prove character, and under the tradi-
tional evidentiary rules reputation evidence used to prove character
is recognized as an exception to the hearsay rule because of its
trustworthiness.2 Evidence of prior acts of intercourse between the
exculpate the defendant. State v. Macumber, 112 Ariz. 569, 544 P.2d 1084 (1976) (special
concurrence). Compare, e.g., United States v. Wingate, 520 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3416 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1976); United States v. Wailing, 486 F.2d 229 (9th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 923 (1974); Pitts v. State, 307 So. 2d 473 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App.), petition for cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 918 (1975); People v. Dukett, 56 Ill. 2d 432, 308
N.E.2d 590, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 965 (1974).
For a discussion of the application of Davis by lower courts see notes 101-02 infra &
accompanying text.
82. E.g., FED. R. EvID. 803(21). As Wigmore explained:
That there is, in the community's reputation, a circumstantial probability of
trustworthiness, fulfilling another fundamental requisite for hearsay exceptions
... is found in the same considerations already mentioned as justifying the use
of reputation on matters of general interest .... Those considerations are that,
where the subject matter is one in which all or many of the members of the
community have an opportunity of acquiring information and have also an
interest or motive to obtain such knowledge, there is likely to be such constant,
active, and intelligent discussion and comparison that the resulting opinion, if
a definite opinion does result, is likely to be fairly trustworthy. That these
considerations apply to a reputation of personal character cannot be doubted.
No fact is more open to general observation, no fact is of more legitimate interest
to the community as an object of knowledge, and consequently no fact is more
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complainant and men other than the defendant usually will take the
form of testimony by the complainant on cross-examination or by
her alleged partner during the defendant's presentation of his de-
fense. As long as this evidence violates no evidentiary rule designed
to protect against the use of unreliable evidence, such as the hearsay
rule, it is no less trustworthy as a class than any other evidence now
admissible. Opinion evidence of the character of the complaining
witness for chastity, as a class, also appears to be trustworthy. Al-
though the use of opinion evidence to prove character from which
conduct can be inferred traditionally has been excluded, 3 this posi-
tion has been criticized vigorously. 4 The modern trend, evidenced
by the recently enacted Federal Rules of Evidence, is to admit such
evidence"5 on the strength of its trustworthiness.
Not only is evidence of the complaining witness's bad character
for chastity considered trustworthy, but in many rape cases it will
be critical to the accused's defense because of its relevance to the
issue of consent and because of the nature of the evidence available
in prosecutions for rape. Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence." 8 In the present context, evidence
of the complaining witness's bad character for chastity is relevant
to the issue of consent if it has any tendency to make it more proba-
ble than not that she consented.
As previously indicated, the great majority of courts has viewed
such evidence as relevant. 7 The older cases reaching this conclu-
the theme of general discussion, criticism, and comparison of views, than moral
character as exhibited in conduct. The community relies upon this reputation
as evidence in social, commercial, and professional relations, and the law of
evidence relies upon it.
5 WIGMORE, supra note 21, at § 1610 (Chadbourn rev. 1974). See also Michelson v. United
States, 335 U.S. 469, 477 (1948).
83. See note 22 supra & accompanying text.
84. 7 WICGMORE, supra note 21, at § 1986.
85. FED. R. EvID. 405. See also CAL. EVID. CODE § 1100 (West 1966).
86. FED. R. EvID. 401 (emphasis supplied). See also CAL. EvID. CODE § 210 (West 1966).
See generally James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 CALIF. L. REV. 689 (1941);
Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy-A Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND. L. REV. 385-98 (1952).
87. See notes 18-21'supra & accompanying text.
One commentator has suggested that because of this virtually unanimous court opinion,
"stare decisis should compel those people who wish to convince the courts otherwise to do
more than simply assert that such evidence is not relevant." Comment, Limitations on the
Right To Introduce Evidence Pertaining to the Prior Sexual History of the Complaining
Witness in Cases of Forcible Rape: Reflection of Reality or Denial of Due Process?, 3 HOFSTRA
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sion, which provide the basis for the traditional view, tended to
incorporate then-existing moral standards in their reasoning. For
example, in People v. Abbot,88 the court stated:
[Aire we to be told that . . .triers should be advised to make
no distinction in their minds between the virgin and a tenant of
the stew? between one who would prefer death to pollution, and
another who, incited by lust and lucre, daily offers her person to
the indiscriminate embraces of the other sex? And will you not
more readily infer assent in the practised Messalina, in loose
attire, than in the reserved and virtuous Lucretia? . . .[Tihere
is not so much probability that a common prostitute or the pris-
oner's concubine would withhold her assent, as one less depraved;
and may I not ask, does not the same probable distinction arise
between one who has already submitted herself to the lewd em-
braces of another, and the coy and modest female, severely chaste
and instinctively shuddering at the thought of impurity? 9
The more recent cases, on the other hand, tend not only to avoid
any outward indication of reliance on moral concepts, but also seem
content merely to state the rule that such evidence is admissible,0
or at most, that "it is more probable that an unchaste woman would
assent to . . . an act [of intercourse] than a virtuous woman."'"
L. REV. 403, 407 n.19 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Reflections of Reality]. It is submitted that
this approach should not be taken, but rather that the relevance of the evidence should be
decided on its merits.
88. 19 Wend. 192 (N.Y. 1838).
89. Id. at 195-96. See also People v. Benson, 6 Cal. 221, 223 (1856) ("[I]t must be obvious
to all that there would be less probability of resistance upon the part of one already de-
bauched in mind and body, than there would be in the case of a pure and chaste female.");
Camp v. State, 3 Ga. 417, 422 (1847) ("[W]ho is more likely to consent to the approaches of
a man, the unsullied virgin and the revered, loved and virtuous mother of a family, or the
lewd and loose prostitute, whose arms are open to the embraces of every coarse brute who
has money enough to pay for the privilege? . ..[N]o evil habitude of humanity so de'praves
the nature, so deadens the moral sense, and obliterates the distinction between right and
wrong, as common, licentious indulgence. Particularly is this true of women, the citadel of
whose character is virtue; when that is lost, all is gone: her love of justice, sense of character,
and regard for truth. She esteems herself as put to the ban of society, and as incapable of
deeper degradation."); Titus v. State, 66 Tenn. 132, 133-34 (1874) ("It would be absurd, and
shock our sense of truth, for any man to affirm that there was not a much greater probability
in favor of the proposition that a common prostitute had yielded her assent to sexual inter-
course than in the case of the virgin of uncontaminated purity."); Lee v. State, 132 Tenn.
655, 179 S.W.145 (1915) ("INlo impartial mind can resist the conclusion that a female who
had been in the recent habit of illicit intercourse with others will not be so likely to resist as
one who is spotless and pure.").
90. See, e.g., cases cited note 21 supra.
91. See note 18 supra.
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Critics of the traditional evidentiary rules, however, point to the
change that has occurred in sexual mores since those rules originally
were fashioned. They argue that although a woman is more likely
to engage in premarital or extramarital sexual activity today, she is
not likely to do so indiscriminately; her decision to consent or not
to consent to sexual relations on a particular occasion is discrete and
unaffected by her past behavior, so that what she has done in the
past has no bearing whatsoever on her future conduct." This argu-
ment, however, is specious. An item of evidence, to be relevant,
need not establish conclusively the desired inference; it need only
make that inference more probable or less probable than it would
be without the offered item of evidence. Regardless of the prevailing
sexual mores" of society, it is still reasonable to conclude that a
woman who never has engaged in sexual intercourse will be less
likely to consent to intercourse on a particular occasion than a
woman who is not a virgin. To state it another way, a woman who
previously has engaged in consensual sexual intercourse will be
more likely to consent to intercourse than one who has not. There-
fore, it must be concluded that the fact of previous consensual sex-
ual intercourse does have some probative value on the issue of con-
sent."
Probative value depends upon the degree of similarity between
the circumstances of the previous acts of sexual intercourse and the
circumstances of the case in question. Various factors such as the
time the previous acts occurred, the places they occurred, the per-
sons involved, and the circumstances leading up to the acts will be
of importance. For example, the fact that an unmarried complain-
ant engaged in consensual sexual relations in her home with her
boyfriend is not highly probative of the issue of consent in a case
involving sexual intercourse with a stranger in his automobile. But
the fact that an unmarried complainant engaged in consensual sex-
ual relations in her home with a man she had met in a singles bar
earlier the same evening may be highly probative of the issue of
consent in a case involving sexual intercourse with a defendant
92. BROWNM!LLER, supra note 2, at 386; Rape & Rape Laws, supra note 2, at 939; Reflection
of Reality, supra note 87, at 414; Note, Indiana's Rape Shield Law: Conflict with the Confron-
tation Clause?, 9 IND. L. REV. 418, 429-30 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Indiana's Rape Shield
Laid; Note, Indicia of Consent? a Proposal for Change to the Common Law Rule Admit-
ting Evidence of A Rape Victims Character for Chastity, 7 LOYOLA L.J. 118, 125 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Indicia of Consent?]; Rape Victim, supra note 5, at 51.
93. California Rape Evidence Reform, supra note 44, at 1570; Reflection of Reality, supra
note 87, at 415; Indicia of Consent?, supra note 92, at 123.
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whom she had met earlier the same evening at a singles bar)4
This is not to say that prevailing societal attitudes about sex have
no effect on the relevance of evidence of previous sexual conduct on
the issue of consent. For example, it can be argued persuasively that
a woman with a "bad character for chastity" is one who has a
tendency or disposition to engage in indiscriminate sexual inter-
course rather than one who at some previous time merely has en-
gaged in either premarital or extramarital sex. The unmarried
woman who has engaged in sexual intercourse only with her boy-
friend would not have a "bad character for chastity." If this is true,
the probative value on the issue of consent of a woman who indeed
does have a "bad character for chastity" under prevailing moral
standards would appear to be quite high, because a woman who is
willing to engage in indiscriminate sexual activity is more likely to
consent on a given occasion than one who does not have such a
character. It follows from this analysis that under today's sexual
mores, although there may be cases in which the previous sexual
conduct of a rape complainant will not be highly relevant on the
issue of consent, there also will be many cases in which a woman's
bad character for chastity will be probative and thus relevant on
that issue.
The type of evidence generally available in prosecutions for rape
often will make evidence of the complainant's bad character for
chastity critical to the accused's defense. Assume that in a prosecu-
tion for rape the complaining witness, who has a bad character for
chastity under the prevailing sexual mores, testifies falsely that her
act of sexual intercourse with the defendant was without her con-
sent. Because "[t]he nature of the crime is such . ..that eyewit-
nesses seldom are available,"95 the trial probably will be reduced to
a swearing contest between the complainant and the defendant on
the issue of consent. If the trier of fact has before it only the com-
plainant's word against the defendant's on this issue, the chances
of a wrongful conviction are probably high." On the other hand, if
94. Reflection of Reality, supra note 87, at 415-16; Indiana's Rape Shield Law, supra note
92, at 430.
95. Stapleman v. State, 150 Neb. 460, 464, 34 N.W.2d 907, 910 (1948). See also In re
Ferguson, 5 Cal. 3d 525, 534-35, 487 P.2d 1234, 1240, 96 Cal. Rptr. 594, 600 (1971).
Professors Kalven and Zeisel, in their study of American juries, reported that the prosecu-
tion presented eyewitness testimony other than the complainant in only four percent of the
rape cases contained in their sample, and the defendant presented such eyewitness testimony,
other than his own testimony, in only 16 percent of the rape cases in the sample. H. KALVEN
& H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 142-43 (1966).
96. It has been stated often that the natural instinct of the jury in a sex offense case is to
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the trier is allowed to learn that this complainant has a tendency
to engage in indiscriminate sexual intercourse,97 the chances of a
wrongful conviction are probably greatly reduced because the trier
is more fully informed of the relevant facts. 8 This is not to say,
however, that it is unconstitutional under the traditional rules of
evidence to exclude opinion evidence of the complainant's bad char-
acter for chastity or evidence of particular acts of sexual intercourse
between the complainant and men other than the defendant. If such
evidence is prohibited, the defendant still can introduce evidence of
the complainant's bad reputation for chastity in order to prove her
bad character for chastity. Therefore, it might be said that evidence
of specific acts with other men or opinion evidence is not "critical"
to the defense of the accused because alternative evidence can be
introduced to prove the same point."
From this analysis it follows that those statutes absolutely pro-
hibiting a defendant in a rape case from introducing evidence of the
complainant's bad character for chastity on the issue of consent
will, in many cases, mechanistically exclude trustworthy evidence
that is both highly relevant and critical to his defense and will
curtail significantly the defendant's cross-examination of the com-
plainant, the most crucial witness against him, on the most impor-
tant issue in the case. Several justifications for this statutory exclu-
sion of evidence and curtailment of cross-examination have been
sympathize with the victim. E.g., People v. Murphy, 59 Cal. 2d 818, 831, 382 P.2d 346, 31
Cal. Rptr. 306, 314 (1963). One commentator has stated:
[TIoo often in rape cases the adversary proceeding will offer the jury the oppor-
tunity to choose between the account of a woman who alleges that she has been
grievously wronged and that of a man accused of both violence and indecency.
In such situations, outrage at the attacker and sympathy for the attacked mean
that the jury will seldom be able to make a dispassionate evaluation of the
prosecutrix's credibility. The result of this almost inevitable jury bias is to
override the presumption of innocence; the defendant in effect must disprove
the accusation.
Comment, The Corroboration Rule and Crimes Accompanying A Rape, 118 U. PA. L. REV.
458, 460 (1970). Compare notes 108-13 & 141 infra & accompanying text.
97. See note 94 supra & accompanying text.
98. In many cases decided under the traditional rules of evidence, courts have held that
the defendant suffered prejudice to his defense when the trial court erroneously excluded
admissible evidence tending to prove the complainant's bad character for chastity. E.g.,
People v. Fryman, 4 I1. 2d 224, 122 N.E.2d 573 (1954).
99. This argument partially explains why, in the typical situation, the exclusion of relevant
hearsay evidence offered by a criminal defendant does not violate his right to a fair trial. Of
course, the main reason for excluding hearsay is that it deprives the opposing party of an
opportunity to cross-examine the hearsay declarant in court and under oath, and conse-
quently, as a class, is not trustworthy.
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advanced. The most obvious one is that it protects the complainant,
and perhaps also her family, from the embarrassment that might
arise if her prior sex life were disclosed in court. But Davis held that
sometimes a witness's desire to testify free from embarrassment
with her reputation unblemished is outweighed by a criminal defen-
dant's right to seek out the truth in defending himself.' 0 Indeed, in
State v. DeLawder,'0 ' the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held
that it was error under Davis to preclude, merely to protect the
witness from embarassment, a defendant charged with statutory
rape from cross-examining the complainant about her previous sex-
ual activities in an attempt to show the possible existence of bias
or an ulterior motive.'" ' Thus it would seem that on the authority
of Davis, the state interest underlying the rape shield statutes must
yield whenever trustworthy evidence offered by the defendant is
critical to his defense. This will be the case in many rape prosecu-
tions when the accused offers evidence to prove the complainant's
bad character for chastity as tending to show consent.
A second, closely related justification for rape shield laws is that
they will aid in crime prevention because victims, knowing that the
statutes protect them from the embarrassment of introduction of
evidence of previous sexual activity, will be encouraged to report
offenses.' 3 Davis, which dealt with a shield statute designed solely
100. 415 U.S. at 320.
101. 28 Md. App. 212, 344 A.2d 446 (1975).
102. DeLawder did not involve a rape shield statute, but the reasoning of the court is
equally applicable to a situation in which the evidence is excluded because of such a statute.
The court in DeLauder stated:
We conclude, as the Court concluded in Davis, ... that the desirability that
the prosecutrix fulfill her public duty to testify free from embarrassment and
with her reputation unblemished must fall before the right of an accused to seek
out the truth in the process of defending himself.
State v. DeLawder, 28 Md. App. 212, -, 344 A.2d 446, 455 (1975).
Davis also has been relied upon by lower courts to conclude that a criminal defendant's
right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him outweighed, under the circum-
stances of the particular case, the state's interest in protecting confidential communications
between a patient and a physician, State v. Hembd, - Minn. -, 232 N.W.2d 872 (1975);
in protecting a witness from the risk of personal harm, Commonwealth v. Johnson,__ Mass.
-, 313 N.E.2d 571 (1974); and in protecting the secrecy of grand jury proceedings, Chesney
v. Robinson, 403 F. Supp. 306 (D. Conn. 1975). And, in Commonwealth v. Michel, - Mass.
-, 327 N.E.2d 720 (1975), the court indicated that the attorney-client privilege, under
some circumstances, might have to yield to a defendant's right of confrontation.
103. ASSEMBLY CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM., CAL. LEGIS. 1973-74 REG. SESS., FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REvISING CALIFORNIA LAWS RELATING TO RAPE (Mar. 1974), quoted in
California Rape Evidence Reform, supra note 44, at 1554; Reflection of Reality, supra note
87, at 407; Indiana's Rape Shield Law, supra note 92, at 435.
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to protect the witness's privacy, did not address the state's interest
in crime prevention. Consequently, a separate analysis of this as-
serted state interest must be conducted.
In determining the weight to be given the state interest in encour-
aging the reporting of rapes, it first must be pointed out that the
fear of embarrassment from the introduction at trial of evidence of
her previous sexual activity is not the only reason a rape victim
might fail to report the crime to the authorities. She might not want
to go through the emotional ordeal of reliving the crime while mak-
ing her report to the police and while testifying on the witness stand.
She may experience shame, or she may not want her husband or
parents to know of the rape. She may fear being accused of provoca-
tion or irresponsiblity, or may fear retaliation by the offender."'
Parents may want to prevent publicity and emotional injury to a
young victim.'"' Thus it is by no means certain that by merely
prohibiting the introduction of evidence of the complainant's pre-
vious sexual conduct at trial these rape shield laws will substan-
tially achieve the goal of increasing the percentage of rapes reported
to the police.
Even if these laws did substantially increase the percentage of
rapes reported, this state interest might not outweigh the defen-
dant's rights to present evidence and cross-examine the complain-
ant. In Roviaro v. United States, "I the United States Supreme
Court faced a similar problem of balancing the defendant's right to
a fair trial against the governmental interest of encouraging the
reporting of crime by granting the government a privilege to refuse
to disclose to the defendant the name of an informant. The Court
recognized that the purpose of the privilege was to aid in effective
law enforcement, but concluded:
104. In Commonwealth v. Johnson, - Mass. __, 313 N.E.2d 571 (1974), the court,
relying on Chambers and Davis, held that curtailed cross-examination of a prosecution wit-
ness in a murder case because of a fear of personal harm to the witness was error. The court
stated:
In the present case . . . the trial judge apparently believed that the right [of
cross-examinationj was lost where a witness balked at answering because an
answer might create a risk of harm to himself ...
There are no clogs or limitations on the right to testimony such as the judge
might have imagined to exist. . . . [Fjear of harm to the witness [cannot]
generally be offered as an excuse for declining testimony. Relief of witnesses on
this ground would encourage intimidation of those in possession of information
and proclaim a sorry confession of weakness of the rule of law.
Id. at -, 313 N.E.2d at 577.
105. Rape & Rape Laws, supra note 2, at 921; Reflection of Reality, supra note 87, at 405.
106. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
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A . . . limitation on the applicability of the privilege arises from
the fundamental requirement of fairness. Where the disclosure of
an informer's identity, or of the contents of his communication,
is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential
to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way.,'
Thus a state interest in encouraging the reporting of rapes through
the adoption of a rape shield law, which at best may only marginally
achieve that goal, apparently must yield whenever a rape defendant
offers trustworthy evidence, critical to his defense of consent, of a
complainant's bad character for chastity.
Another justification advanced in support of rape shield laws is
that they enhance the fact-finding process by eliminating the possi-
bility that the jury will be prejudiced against the complainant if it
hears evidence concerning her previous sexual conduct and hence
will acquit the defendant solely on that basis."" There is some em-
pirical data to support the proposition that juries sometimes acquit
rape defendants, or convict them of a lesser offense, because of the
jurors' moral judgment of the complainant's sex life. Although rape
cases arguably go through a more stringent preliminary screening
process to eliminate false accusations and weak cases than do other
crimes,"' Professors Kalven and Zeisel, in their study of American
107. Id. at 60-61 (emphasis supplied). The Court held that the so-called informer's privi-
lege must yield when the evidence sought is merely "helpful" to the defense of the accused,
rather than when it is "critical" to that defense.
108. Indicia of Consent?, supra note 92, at 131-32. Cf. California Rape Evidence Reform,
supra note 44, at 1571-72.
109. The Uniform Crime Reports states that "[als a national average, 15 percent of all
forcible rapes reported to police were determined by investigation to be unfounded. In other
words, the police established that no forcible rape offense or attempt occurred." FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 24 (1975). A study
of the Philadelphia Police Department during the latter half of 1966 revealed that approxi-
mately 20 percent of the rape complaints received were unfounded. Comment, Police Discre-
tion and the Judgment that A Crime Has Been Committed-Rape in Philadelphia, 117 U.
PA. L. REv. 277, 281 (1968). The authors of the Philadelphia study believe that both the figure
they obtained and the figures reported by the F.B.I. are misleadingly low because they are
based on the number of offenses investigated as rapes, whereas not all rape complaints are
investigated as rape offenses. They conclude that "[pirobably, at least 50% of the reported
rapes are unfounded by the police." Id. at 279 n.8. The President's Crime Commission
reported that "Iiln the case of forcible rape some police departments regularly conclude that
as many as 50 percent of the complaints received were not offenses," whereas
"'luInfounding' rates for other crimes are generally lower, about 10 percent for auto theft
and less than 1 percent for other [Uniform Crime Reports] Index offenses." THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME
AND ITS IMPACT-AN ASSESSMENT 25 (1967).
It is also commonly known that prosecutors pursue only those rape cases in which there is
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juries, reported that the acquittal rate for persons accused of forci-
ble rape was higher than the overall average acquittal rate for all
crimes."'0 They also reported that in cases of what they termed
simple rape, in which there was no evidence of extreme violence or
several assailants, or in which the defendant and the victim were
not total strangers at the time of the event, the jury convicted in
only three of 42 cases, whereas the judge who presided at the trial
would have convicted in 21 of the cases."' Further analysis of this
data, however, does not strongly support the conclusion that the
jury was prejudiced against the complainant because of evidence of
her unchastity per se. In all but one of the cases discussed by the
authors, the evidence that arguably produced the jury prejudice was
not evidence of the complaining witness's bad reputation for chast-
ity, opinion evidence of her bad character for chastity, or evidence
of specific acts of sexual intercourse with men other than the defen-
dant, but rather was evidence of either the circumstances leading
up to the event or of her prior sexual activity with the defendant."2
In fact, Kalven and Zeisel concluded:
The law recognizes only one issue in rape cases other than the
fact of intercourse: whether there was consent at the moment of
intercourse. The jury, as we come to see it, does not limit itself
to this one issue; it goes on to weigh the woman's conduct in the
prior history of the affair. It closely, and often harshly, scrutinizes
the female complainant and is moved to be lenient with the de-
fendant whenever there are suggestions of contributory behavior
on her part. "3
This study thus does not appear to support strongly the proposi-
tion that excluding evidence of the complainant's bad character for
a strong probability of conviction and that they are willing to accept a plea of guilty to a lesser
offense, such as battery, when the chances of a conviction for rape are small.
110. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 95, at 56, 69-75. The authors reported that the acquittal
rate for all crimes in the sample was 30.3 percent, whereas the acquittal rate in cases of
forcible rape was 43 percent. Acquittal rates for other major crimes were:
m urder ................... 20% robbery ................... 25%
manslaughter .............. 46% burglary .................. 26%
negligent homicide ......... 46% other grand larceny ........ 38%
aggravated assault ......... 36% arson ..................... 37%
kidnapping ................ 8% narcotics .................. 12%
111. Id. at 253-54.
112. Id. at 249-51.
113. Id. at 249 (emphasis supplied).
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chastity will enhance the fact-finding process. Even if it could be
shown that there are cases in which the jury does acquit a guilty
defendant because of its moral judgment of the complainant, it does
not follow that the state's interest in preventing such acquittals
outweighs a defendant's interest in presenting evidence or in cross-
examining the complainant. Wigmore, in a slightly different con-
text, stated:
Between the evil of putting an innocent or perhaps an erring
woman's security at the mercy of a villain, and the evil of putting
an innocent man's liberty at the mercy of an unscrupulous and
revengeful mistress, it is hard to strike a balance. But, with re-
gard to the intensity of injustice involved in an erroneous verdict,
and the practical frequency of either danger, the admission of the
evidence seems preferable. . . .[Tihe real question is, which
state of fact is the commoner and the one most needing our pro-
tection? The answer to this must depend more or less on the
experience and the sentiments of each community."'
Our society has long accepted the fundamental value determination
that "it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty
man go free.""' 5 Although under the traditional rules of evidence
there is a chance that some juries might acquit a guilty defendant
in a rape prosecution because the jurors were prejudiced against the
complaining witness by evidence of her prior sexual conduct, this
result seems preferable to convicting innocent men merely because
the juries hearing their cases were not informed fully of the relevant
facts. It would seem therefore that the state's desire to eliminate the
possibility of jury bias against the complainant must yield whenever
necessary to assure the defendant's rights to a fair trial and confron-
tation.
Although the above analysis demonstrates the serious constitu-
tional problems raised by rape shield laws, in People v. Blackburn'"
the only appellate court to consider the validity of such a statute
rejected the defendant's contention that he had been denied a fair
trial and his right of confrontation by the statute's mandatory ex-
clusion of evidence of the complainant's bad reputation for chastity,
114. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 21, at § 200.
115. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). Cf. Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
Blackstone stated: "[Tihe law holds it better that ten guilty persons escape than that one
innocent party suffer." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 358.
116. 56 Cal. App. 3d 685, 128 Cal. Rptr. 864 (1976).
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opinion evidence of her bad character for chastity, and evidence of
specific acts of sexual intercourse between the complainant and
men other than the defendant on the issue of consent. The court
stated:
The [statute] does not deny to the defendant the due process
rights to a fair trial or confrontation of witnesses against him.
Unlike the situation where evidence establishing the bias of a
prosecution witness or his motive to testify falsely is excluded
. . . the evidence barred by [the statute] does not concern the
credibility of a witness so as to affect the right of confrontation.
[The statute] excludes evidence of the victim's sexual conduct
only when it is offered to prove consent. That limited exclusion
no more deprives a defendant of a fair trial than do the rules of
evidence barring hearsay, opinion evidence, and privileged com-
munications. Hearsay evidence tending to exonerate a defendant
may be highly relevant to his innocence but is excluded from
consideration by the jury. So also is testimony from a highly
respected citizen that he believes the defendant did not commit
the crime or, absent a waiver of privilege, testimony of a clergy-
man that another person has confessed the crime in a manner
exonerating the defendant. In those situations, policy considera-
tions dictate that the evidence be excluded, and those policy
considerations are deemed within the definition of a fair trial.17
Examination of the court's opinion, however, reveals faulty reason-
ing. First, the right of confrontation is not restricted to attempts to
impeach the credibility of a witness, but also includes the right to
cross-examine. One of the goals of cross-examination, insofar as
allowed by the applicable rule concerning its permissible scope,"' is
to contribute independently to the favorable development of the
cross-examiner's case through the testimony of an adverse wit-
ness." 9 Secondly, the court's analogy to the hearsay rule, the opinion
rule, and the rules concerning privileged communications is drawn
poorly. Each of those rules merely precludes a method of proof; none
of them completely forecloses all proof in a relevant area, as the
statute challenged in Blackburn and similar rape shield statutes do.
For example, whenever relevant evidence offered by a criminal de-
fendant is excluded by the hearsay rule, the defendant has the op-
117. Id. at 690, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
118. See, e.g., McCORMICK, supra note 24, at §§ 21-25, 29.
119. E.g., KEETON, TRIAL TACTICS AND METHODS 88 (1954); 5 WIGMORE, supra note 21, at §
1368 (Chadbourn rev. 1974); McCoRMICK, supra note 24, at § 29.
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portunity to prove precisely the same fact by non-hearsay evi-
dence.' Under the statute at issue in Blackburn and similar rape
shield statutes, however, all evidence of the complainant's bad char-
acter for chastity is excluded on the issue of consent.'' There is no
other evidence to which the defendant can resort to prove the com-
plainant's tendency or disposition to engage in sexual intercourse. 22
This analysis demonstrates that there will be many rape prosecu-
tions in which the absolute exclusion of all evidence of the com-
plaining witness's bad reputation for chastity, opinion evidence of
her bad character for chastity, and evidence of specific instances of
sexual intercourse between the complaining witness and men other
than the defendant will result in denial of the defendant's constitu-
tional rights to a fair trial and to confront the witnesses against him.
It therefore would seem unwise for a state to enact a rape shield law
that absolutely excludes such evidence.
Requirement of A Hearing Before Admitting Evidence of Com-
plainant's Bad Character for Chastity
Short of absolutely prohibiting a rape defendant from introducing
evidence of the complainant's bad character for chastity, other
means are available to protect rape complainants from disclosure of
their prior sexual conduct in court and to prevent in many cases any
possible jury bias against the complainant caused by the jury's
knowledge of her sex life. Several states have enacted statutes re-
quiring the trial judge in a rape case to conduct a hearing, either in
camera or merely outside the presence of the jury, on the admissibil-
ity of evidence of the complaining witness's bad character for chast-
ity offered by the defendant on the issue of consent.'23 The standards
for a finding of admissibility differ, but at a minimum, each statute
120. This assumes, of course, that this alternative evidence is not precluded by some other
evidentiary rule such as the opinion rule or a rule concerning privileges.
121. Although evidence of previous specific acts of sexual intercourse between the com-
plainant and the defendant is admissible under the California statute, this evidence is not
used to prove the complainant's bad character for chastity from which consent can be in-
ferred, but rather is used to show an emotion toward the particular defendant. See notes 27-
29 supra & accompanying text.
122. The court in Blackburn also can be criticized for its statement that the exclusion of
evidence mandated by the statute "no more deprives a defendant of a fair trial than [does]
the [rule] of evidence barring hearsay . . . . Hearsay evidence tending to exonerate a defen-
dant may be highly relevant to his innocence but is excluded from consideration by the jury."
56 Cal. App. 3d at 690; 128 Cal. Rptr. at 866. This statement flies directly in the face of the
Supreme Court's decision in Chambers. See notes 67-75 supra & accompanying text.
123. See notes 50-52 supra & accompanying text.
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requires that the judge determine whether the evidence offered by
the defendant is relevant to the issue of consent. The majority also
expressly require the judge to balance the probative value of the
evidence against its prejudicial or inflammatory nature,' and a few
also expressly require the judge to consider other factors such as
the danger that the evidence will lead to a confusion of issues 2 '
or will mislead the jury,' 6 the amount of time that will be consumed
by the introduction of the evidence,'27 the privacy interest of the
complainant, 8 and the interests of the defendant in introducing the
evidence. 2 It is submitted that each of these statutes can be inter-
preted to achieve the state's goal of eliminating possible jury bias
against the complainant in many cases. Additionally, some of the
statutes can operate to protect the complainant from embarrass-
ment and to encourage the reporting of rapes. Yet these laws also
can safeguard the defendant's due process and confrontation rights
in all cases.
Those statutes merely requiring the judge to detemine the rele-
vancy of the evidence of the complainant's previous sexual conduct
are likely to cause few constitutional problems if judges conscien-
tiously consider the defendant's due process and confrontation
rights and the holdings of Chambers, Davis, and Roviaro. These
statutes clearly allow a trial judge to admit the evidence of the
complainant's previous sexual conduct on the issue of consent if,
under the facts of the particular case, he finds the evidence relevant
to that issue and critical to the defense of the accused or necessary
for an adequate cross-examination of a crucial witness. On the other
hand, these statutes require the trial judge to exclude the evidence
if, under the facts of the particular case, he determines that it is not
significantly probative of the issue of consent because the evidence
is remote, because it does not tend to show a disposition to engage
in indiscriminate sexual intercourse, or because the circumstances
of the previous sexual activity were dissimilar to those in the case
before him.'30 Such evidence thus would not be critical to the de-
124. ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.045 (Supp. 1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609, 347 (Supp. 1976);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.069 (1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-9-26 (Supp. 1975); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 21.13 (Supp. 1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.79.150 (Supp. 1975).
125. ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.045 (Supp. 1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.069 (1975):
126. NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.069 (1975).
127. Id.
128. ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.045 (Supp. 1975).
129. N.Y. CRIM. PRO. § 60.42 (McKinney Supp. 1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.79.150
(Supp. 1975).
130. See notes 93 & 94 supra & accompanying text.
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fense of the accused or necessary for an adequate cross-examination
of a crucial adverse witness. By excluding the evidence, the state's
goals of eliminating the possibility of jury prejudice against the
complainant and, if the hearing is held in camera, 3' of avoiding
embarrassment to the complainant are achieved, while the rights of
the defendant also are safeguarded.
Those statutes requiring the judge to consider, in addition to the
relevancy of the evidence of the complainant's previous sexual con-
duct, "'32 certain collateral policies other than the interests of the
defendant are apt to cause constitutional problems. They can be
interpreted to require the trial judge to exclude evidence relevant
to the issue of consent and critical to the defense of the accused or
necessary for an adequate cross-examination of a crucial witness if
he determines that one or more of the collateral policy considera-
tions outweighs the probative value of the offered evidence. Under
most circumstances such a result will conflict with the holdings in
Chambers and Davis and will violate either the defendant's right to
a fair trial, or his right of confrontation, or both. However, it is
possible to interpret these statutes so that they do not conflict with
Chambers and Davis if they are read to require the trial judge to
strike the balance in favor of the accused. If the judge admits the
evidence whenever it is of significant probative value and excludes
it only when the weight given to the collateral policy consideration
is heavy and the probative value is slight, few defendants will be
denied their due process and confrontation rights and the state's
goals will be achieved in the maximum number of cases."'
131. If the hearing is held merely outside the presence of the jury so that spectators in the
courtroom can hear the evidence of the complainant's previous sexual activity when an offer
of proof is made by the defendant, the complaining witness will suffer the same amount of
embarrassment as if the evidence actually were introduced at trial. A rape shield law that is
truly concerned with the privacy of the complaining witness therefore will require an in
camera hearing.
132. See notes 124-28 supra & accompanying text.
133. There might be some problem with the Minnesota statute, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.347
(Supp. 1976), because it apparently absolutely prohibits a rape defendant from introducing
reputation evidence and opinion evidence on the issue of consent as well as evidence of
specific instances of sexual activity between the complainant and men other than the defen-
dant that occurred more than one year prior to the date of the alleged offense. It is conceivable
that a rape defendant might offer evidence of specific instances of sexual activity between
the complainant and other men that occurred more than one year prior to the date of the
alleged offense which is highly probative of the issue of consent and which, partly because
reputation and opinion evidence is barred, is critical to his defense or necessary for an
adequate cross-examination of the complainant. The exclusion of such evidence under these
assumed facts would appear to violate the defendant's right to a fair trial, and possibly also
his right of confrontation. See notes 82-122 supra & accompanying text.
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Restrictions on Using Evidence of Prior Specific Acts of Inter-
course between Complainant and Defendant
As stated earlier, evidence of prior specific instances of sexual
intercourse between a rape complainant and the defendant, when
offered by the defendant on the issue of consent, is not used to prove
that the complaining witness has a general disposition to engage in
acts of sexual intercourse from which consent on the occasion in
question can be inferred.'34 Rather, it is used to show "an inclination
on her part to consent to [the] embraces [of the defendant], thus
negativing an essential element in the crime charged." '35 A separate
analysis therefore is necessary for those statutes placing restrictions
on the admissibility of this type of evidence.
None of the rape shield statutes enacted thus far absolutely pro-
hibits a defendant charged.with rape from introducing evidence of
prior acts of intercourse between himself and the complainant.'36
Such an absolute prohibition would raise constitutional problems in
far more cases than the absolute prohibition of evidence of the com-
plainant's bad character for chastity on the issue of consent. Evi-
dence of prior sexual activity between the complainant and the
defendant is trustworthy. It usually takes the form of testimony by
the defendant during the presentation of his case or an admission
by the complainant on cross-examination. As a class, neither form
of testimony is any less trustworthy than any other evidence cur-
rently admissible. In addition, this evidence is relevant to the issue
of consent. Regardless of the prevailing sexual mores of society, the
complainant is more likely to have consented to the sexual inter-
course for which the defendant is being tried if she previously had
engaged in consensual intercourse with him. More importantly, the
probative value of this evidence is generally much greater than that
of the complainant's bad character for chastity,'37 and often will be
as critical to the defense of the accused. 138
The justifications for any limitation on the defendant's right to
present evidence of previous sexual activity between the complain-
134. See notes 27-29 supra & accompanying text.
135. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 21, at § 402.
136. See note 53-56 supra & accompanying text.
137. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 21, at § 200.
Even Susan Brownmiller, a feminist who has been quite critical of the traditional eviden-
tiary rules in rape cases, agrees that the probative value of this evidence on the issue of
consent is greater than evidence of the complainant's bad character for chastity, and therefore
"probably should not be barred." BROWNMILLER, supra note 2, at 386.
138. See notes 95-98 supra & accompanying text.
[Vol. 18:1
RAPE SHIELD LAWS
ant and himself and to cross-examine the complainant as to such
activity are the same as those discussed in connection with the
validity of an absolute prohibition on the introduction by a defen-
dant of evidence of the complainant's bad character for chastity.",
The first two justifications, to avoid embarrassment of the com-
plainant and to encourage the reporting of crime, can be accorded
no more weight in the present context than they were in the former,
and under Davis and Roviaro, must yield whenever necessary to
insure the defendant's rights to a fair trial and confrontation.
The justification of eliminating possible jury bias against the
complainant, however, requires a deeper analysis in the present
context because of the results of the study conducted by Professors
Kalven and Zeisel. Their study showed that a rape complainant's
prior sexual activity with the defendant apparently has some effect
on the jury's verdict.4 ° For example, they report:
In one . . case the judge tells us: "This was a savage case of
rape. Jaw of complaining witness fractured in two places." Nev-
ertheless the jury acquits when it learns that there may have been
intercourse with the complainant on prior occasions. The judge
adds: "The parties knew each other and went out together on
several occasions and on evening in question had been drinking.
...Defendant claimed he had been having intercourse with
complainant prior to occurrence."''
Even though jury bias is more likely in cases involving evidence of
previous sexual activity between the complainant and the accused
than in cases involving evidence of bad character for chastity, the
probative value of this type of evidence on the issue of consent is
generally greater. Thus there would be more cases in which the
absolute exclusion of this type of evidence under a rape shield law
would result in the denial of the defendant's constitutional rights
than there would be from the exclusion of evidence of the complain-
ant's bad character for chastity. This is probably why none of the
rape shield statutes now in effect absolutely exclude this evidence.
This is not to say, however, that the criminal justice system must
accept the possibility of jury bias against the complainant in all
rape trials in which the accused attempts to show consent through
the presentation of evidence of previous instances of sexual activity
139. See notes 100-15 supra & accompanying text.
140. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 95, at 249-54.
141. Id. at 251.
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between himself and the complainant. Several states have enacted
statutes requiring the trial judge to conduct a hearing, either in
camera or merely outside the presence of the jury, on the admissibil-
ity of evidence of previous instances of sexual activity between the
complainant and the accused offered by the accused to show con-
sent.' All but one of these statutes require that the judge find that
the evidence is relevant to the issue of consent before holding it
admissible,' and the majority also direct the judge to weigh the
probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial or inflamma-
tory nature.'" It is submitted that each of these statutes can be
interpreted to achieve in a great many cases the state's goal of
eliminating the possibility of jury bias against the complainant
caused by its knowledge of her previous consensual sexual relations
with the accused. If the hearing is held in camera the state's goals
both of protecting the complainant from embarrassment and of en-
couraging the reporting of rapes can be achieved, while at the same
time safeguarding the defendant's right to a fair trial and his right
of confrontation in all cases.
Those statutes merely requiring the judge to determine the rele-
vancy of the evidence of previous sexual conduct between the com-
plainant and the accused on the issue of consent do not create
constitutional problems. They clearly allow a trial judge to admit
the evidence if, under the facts of the particular case, he finds that
the evidence is relevant to the issue of consent and critical to the
defense of the accused or necessary for an adequate cross-
examination of a crucial witness against him, thus meeting the re-
quirements of Chambers and Davis. Those statutes that addition-
ally require the trial judge to weigh the prejudicial or inflammatory
nature of the evidence against its probative value can be read to
142. See notes 53 & 54 supra.
143. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-5-503(5) (interim Supp. 1975) merely requires that the
judge find that the evidence is of prior sexual activity between the complainant and the
defendant.
144. ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.045 (Supp. 1975); IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-1-32.5-2 (Burns 1976);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (Supp. 1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.347 (Supp. 1976);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.069 (1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-9-26 (Supp. 1975); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 2907.02(D),(E) (Page Supp. 1975); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.13 (Supp. 1975); Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 971.31(11), 972.11, Wis. Leg. Ser. ch. 184 (1975).
A few of the statutes also expressly require the judge to consider such additional factors as
the danger that the evidence will create confusion of the issues, ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.045
(Supp. 1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.069 (1975); the danger that the evidence will mislead the
jury or consume an undue amount of time, NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.069 (1975); and the privacy
interests of the complaining witness, ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.045 (Supp. 1975).
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require the judge to strike the balance in favor of the accused. By
this reading, the judge would admit the evidence whenever he
makes a finding that it is significantly probative and critical to the
defense or necessary for an adequate cross-examination of a crucial
adverse witness, thereby safeguarding the defendant's constitu-
tional rights.'45 Such an interpretation, for instance, might allow a
trial judge to exclude the evidence in cases similar to that discussed
by Kalven and Zeisel 46 on the ground that under the facts of the
particular case, when the complaining witness suffered a fractured
jaw, the evidence of previous sexual activity between the defendant
and the complainant has little probative value on the issue of con-
sent, and in addition, that the slight probative value of the evidence
is outweighed by the danger of jury bias against the complainant.'47
This interpretation of these rape shield laws thus would achieve the
state's goal of eliminating the possibility of jury prejudice. Addi-
tionally, if the hearing is held in camera, the complaining witness
will be protected from embarrassment and the reporting of rapes
will be encouraged in many cases. On the other hand, because there
is no blanket exclusion of this type of evidence, it can be admitted
if required by the holdings in Chambers and Davis to safeguard the
rights of the accused.
Restrictions on Using Evidence of Complainant's Prior Sexual Con-
duct to Rebut Evidence Introduced by the Prosecution
More than one-half of the rape shield laws now in effect place
some restrictions on a rape defendant's traditional right to intro-
duce evidence of specific acts of sexual intercourse between the
complaining witness and men other than himself to rebut certain
evidence introduced by the prosecution to substantiate the com-
plainant's story as to the fact of intercourse. Such prosecution evi-
dence might be that the complainant became pregnant, gave birth
to a child, became afflicted with a venereal disease, or had a rup-
tured hymen.' A few of these statutes absolutely prohibit a defen-
dant from introducing for this purpose evidence of specific acts of
145. A similar interpretation can be given to those statutes requiring the trial judge to
consider those other collateral policies discussed in note 144 supra.
146. See note 141 supra & accompanying text.
147. The evidence also might be excluded on the ground that under the facts of the particu-
lar case consent is not a genuine issue. See note 31 supra & accompanying text.
148. See note 36 supra & accompanying text.
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sexual intercourse. 49 Others exclude all such evidence unless the
trial judge finds the evidence admissible after an in camera hearing
at which he considers its relevance and, under all but one of these
statutes, also its prejudicial or inflammatory nature."5" Such evi-
dence is admitted by one statute without a hearing if it is offered
to rebut evidence "which proves or tends to prove that the accused
is the cause of pregnancy or disease of the victim, or the source of
semen found in the victim," but the statute requires a hearing be-
fore admitting this evidence to rebut other evidence introduced by
the prosecution. 5' Still others absolutely exclude all such evidence
except evidence showing the source or origin of semen, pregnancy,
or disease. Such evidence is admitted only if the judge, after a
hearing held either in camera or merely outside the presence of the
jury, finds that the evidence is relevant and, under all but one of
these statutes, that its probative value is not outweighed by its
prejudicial or inflammatory nature.5 ' When these statutes are ana-
149. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(2) (Supp. 1976); ORE. REV. STAT. § 163. 475 (1975); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 972.11, Wis. Leg. Ser. ch. 184 (1975).
150. ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.045 (Supp. 1975) (court must find that the evidence is relevant
and that its probative value "is not outweighed by the probability that its admission will
create undue prejudice"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 782.4 (Supp. 1976) (court must consider the
"relevancy" of the evidence); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-9-26 (Supp. 1975) (court must find that
the evidence is "material to the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does
not outweigh its probative value"); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 23-44-16.1 (Supp. 1976)
(court must "consider and rule upon the relevancy and materiality of the evidence"); TEX,
PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.13 (Supp. 1975) (court must find that "the evidence is material to a
fact at issue in the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh
its probative value").
Under the Alaska statute the court also must find that the probative value of the evidence
"is not outweighed by the probability that its admission will create . . . confusion of the
issues, or unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the complaining witness .. "
151. N.Y. CRIM. PRO. § 60.42(4) (McKinney Supp. 1975). Evidence that "rebuts evidence
introduced by the people of the victim's failure to engage in sexual intercourse, deviate sexual
intercourse or sexual contact during a given period of time" is also admissible without a
hearing. When a hearing is required, it shall be one "outside the hearing of the jury, or...
as the court may require," and to admit the evidence the court must find that it is "relevant
and admissible in the interests of justice". Id. at § 60.42(3), (4).
152. MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (Supp. 1976) (court must find, after an in camera
hearing, that the evidence is "material to a fact at issue in the case and that its inflammatory
or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative value"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.347
(Supp. 1976) (court must find, after a hearing outside the presence of the jury, that the
evidence is "material to the fact at issue in the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial
nature does not outweigh its probative value"); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-5-503(5) (in-
terim Supp. 1975) (court must find, after a hearing outside the presence of the jury, that the
evidence is "at issue in the prosecution"); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2907. 02(D), (E) (Page
Supp. 1975) (court must find, after an in camera hearing, that "the evidence is material to a
fact at issue in the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh
its probative value").
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lyzed under the holdings of Chambers and Davis, it appears that
many of them will deny certain rape defendants their constitutional
rights to a fair trial and to confront the witnesses against them.
Although the use of evidence of previous sexual activity between
the complainant and other men to rebut evidence introduced by the
state is not as common as the use of evidence of the complainant's
previous sexual conduct to prove consent, it is offered in some cases.
The probative value of the evidence when used for this purpose is
quite high. For example, if the prosecution has introduced evidence
showing that semen was found in the complaining witness shortly
after the time of the alleged rape by the accused, it is less probable
that the defendant would be convicted if evidence were introduced
to show that at about the time of the alleged offense the complain-
ant had engaged in a consensual act of sexual intercourse with some-
one other than the defendant. The evidence introduced by the de-
fendant provides an alternative explanation for the presence of the
semen and is thus critical to his defense. The state's evidence will
make it clear to the jury that someone engaged in intercourse with
the complainant at the time in question, and if the complainant
testifies falsely that it was the defendant, the chances of a wrongful
conviction are probably quite high. But if the jury is allowed to hear
evidence that at the relevant time the complainant had engaged in
a consensual act of sexual intercourse with someone other than the
defendant, thus explaining the presence of the semen, the chances
of a wrongful conviction will be greatly reduced.'53 Not only will the
evidence usually be relevant and critical to the defense of the ac-
cused, but also because it usually will take the form of testimony
by the complaining witness on cross-examination or by her alleged
partner during the presentation of the defendant's case, such evi-
dence, as a class, will be no less trustworthy than any other evidence
now admissible.1 54
Thus there will be cases in which the absolute prohibition of such
evidence to rebut that introduced by the state to help prove the fact
of intercourse on the occasion in question will prevent the defendant
from introducing trustworthy evidence that is critical to his defense
or necessary for an adequate cross-examination of the complainant,
a crucial witness against him. The justifications for this absolute
prohibition are the same as those found insufficient in other con-
153. See notes 95-98 supra & accompanying text.
154. See notes 83-85 supra & accompanying text.
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texts to outweigh the defendant's interest in presenting the evidence
or cross-examining the witness. It follows that those statutes abso-
lutely prohibiting a rape defendant from introducing evidence of
sexual intercourse between the complainant and men other than the
defendant will deprive some rape defendants of their right to a fair
trial and their right of confrontation. 5
In contrast, those statutes merely excluding such evidence for this
purpose unless the trial judge, after a hearing, finds that the evi-
dence is admissible, can be interpreted to meet the requirements of
Chambers and Davis. There is no problem with the statutes that
merely require the judge to consider the relevancy of the evidence,
because if he finds that it is relevant and critical to the defense of
the accused or necessary for an adequate cross-examination of a
crucial adverse witness, he can admit the evidence. Those statutes
requiring the judge to weigh the probative value of the evidence
against its prejudicial or inflammatory nature can be interpreted to
require the judge to strike the balance in favor of the accused and
admit the evidence if it is necessary to insure the defendant a fair
trial or his right of confrontation. This interpretation of these stat-
utes will safeguard the defendant's constitutional rights in all cases
and, at the same time, will achieve in as many cases as possible the
state's goal of eliminating the possibility of jury bias against the
complainant. Under those statutes requiring an in camera hearing,
the state's goals of protecting the complaining witness from embar-
rassment and of encouraging the reporting of rapes also will be
achieved.
Restrictions on Using Evidence of Complainant's Previous Sexual
Conduct to Impeach the Credibility of a Witness
All but one of the rape shield laws now in effect apparently re-
strict using evidence of a rape complainant's previous sexual con-
duct to impeach the credibility of a witness for the prosecution.' 6
The most restrictive of these statutes absolutely prohibit a rape
defendant from using any such evidence for impeachment pur-
poses. ' 7 Application of the holding in Davis to these statutes leads
to the conclusion that they are likely to deprive some rape defen-
dants of their constitutional right to confront the witnesses against
them.
155. See notes 130-33 supra & accompanying text.
156. See notes 60-64 supra.
157. See notes 60 & 61 supra.
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Evidence of the complainant's previous sexual conduct is allowed
for impeachment purposes in two basic ways: by introduction of
evidence of bad character for chastity, and by introduction of evi-
dence of specific instances of sexual intercourse. Although the ma-
jority of courts have held that there is not a sufficient relationship
between the character for chastity of a female witness, including a
rape complainant, and her credibility to allow her to be impeached
by evidence of her bad character for chastity,'55 some courts have
held to the contrary and, at a minimum, have allowed the complain-
ant in a rape case to be impeached by evidence of her bad reputation
for chastity.' 5 Some of these courts also have allowed the complain-
ant to be impeached by evidence of specific instances of sexual
intercourse. 60
Wigmore took the position that, in general, the probative value
of a female witness's bad character for chastity on the issue of her
credibility is weak and impeachment by such evidence should not
be allowed. 6' Nevertheless, he strongly advocated the creation of an
exception when the witness is a complainant in a sex offense case.
He stated:
There is, however, at least one situation in which chastity may
have a direct connection with veracity, viz, when a woman or
young girl testifies as complainant against a man charged with a
sexual crime-rape, rape under age, seduction, assault. Modern
psychiatrists have amply studied the behavior of errant young
girls and women coming before the courts in all sorts of cases.
Their psychic complexes are multifarious, distorted partly by
inherent defects, partly by diseased derangements or abnormal
instincts, partly by bad social environment, partly by temporary
physiological or emotional conditions. One form taken by these
complexes is that of contriving false charges of sexual offenses by
men. The unchaste (let us call it) mentality finds incidental but
158. 3A WIGMORE, supra note 21, at §§ 923-24 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). See, e.g., Dewey v.
Funk, 211 Kan. 54, 505 P.2d 722 (1973); State v. Kain, 330 S.W.2d 842 (Mo. 1960); Carpenter
v. State, 530 P.2d 1049 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975); State v. Geer, 13 Wash. App. 71, 533 P.2d
389 (1975).
159. E.g., Andrews v. State, 196 Ga. 84, 26 S.E.2d 263, cert. denied, 320 U.S. 780 (1943);
Commonwealth v. McDonald, 110 Mass. 405 (1872); People v. McLean, 71 Mich. 309, 38
N.W. 917 (1888); Frank v. State, 150 Neb. 745, 35 N.W.2d 816 (1949); State v. Cox, 280 N.C.
689, 187 S.E.2d 1 (1972); State v. Pierson, 175 Wash. 650, 27 P.2d 1068 (1933).
160. E.g., Frady v. State, 212 Ga. 84, 90 S.E.2d 664 (1955); Frank v. State, 150 Neb. 745,
35 N.W.2d 816 (1949); State v. Tuttle, 28 N.C. App. 198, 220 S.E.2d 630 (1975) (only on cross-
examination of complaining witness).
161. 3A WIGMORE, supra note 21, at §§ 922, 924 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
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direct expression in the narration of imaginary sex incidents of
which the narrator is the heroine or the victim. On the surface
the narration is straightforward and convincing. The real victim,
however, too often in such cases is the innocent man; for the
respect and sympathy naturally felt by any tribunal for a
wronged female helps to give easy credit to such a plausible tale.
No judge should ever let a sex offense charge go to the jury
unless the female complainant's social history and mental
makeup have been examined and testified to by a qualified
physician. I
This view, however, recently has come under severe attack.!:' One
commentator points out that Wigmore, in reaching his conclusion,
relied upon five case histories of mentally ill girls who made false
sexual accusations against men but in which the men accused were
not convicted of sexual crimes, and that he failed to cite even one
illustration of a man falsely convicted of rape."4 This commentator
recognized that it would be foolish to assert that fabricated charges
of rape are never made, but concluded that "there is no reason to
conclude that juries are less able to deal with fabrication in rape
than they are in any other types of cases."'6 5 This conclusion appears
to be valid. It would seem, especially in light of today's sexual mores
and the traditional majority view of the courts, that the probative
value of a female witness's bad character for chastity on the issue
of her credibility is weak even when the witness is a complainant in
a rape case. As a matter of human nature, a disposition to engage
in sexual intercourse does not commonly involve a lack of veracity.
As one court recently explained:
If the witness' reputation for chastity is so bad that it has in some
way affected his or her reputation for truth and veracity, then the
direct question can be asked as to reputation for truth and verac-
ity. If the witness' reputation for chastity has not produced this
result, then the jury should not be invited to make this deduc-
tion."'6
162. Id. at § 924a (emphasis in original).
163. E.g., A Feminist View, supra note 4, at 335-38; Rape & Rape Laws, supra note 2, at
931, 933-34; Repeal Not Reform, supra note 3, at 1376-78. But see Hibey, supra note 42, at
328.
164. A Feminist View, supra note 4, at 336-37. See also Rape Victim, supra note 5, at 39
n.21.
165. A Feminist View, supra note 4, at 337-38.
166. State v. Geer, 13 Wash. App. 71, 74, 533 P.2d 389, 391 (1975), quoting State v. Wolf,
40 Wash. 2d 648, 653, 245 P.2d 1009, 1012 (1952).
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Exclusion of such evidence for impeachment purposes therefore will
not curtail significantly the defendant's cross-examination of a cru-
cial witness against him and will not deny him his constitutional
right of confrontation.
Evidence of specific instances of sexual activity between the com-
plainant and the defendant or between the complainant and other
men has been allowed to impeach the credibility of the complain-
ant, or her partner if he testifies against the accused, if it tends to
show the possibility of bias or ill-will on the part of the witness
toward the defendant or a motive for her to testify falsely. "7 For
example, in State v. Elijah,"' a witness testified for the state that
the defendant had admitted to him that he had engaged in sexual
intercourse with the complainant. The trial judge prohibited the
defendant from impeaching this witness by showing that the witness
previously had engaged in acts of sexual intercourse with the com-
plainant. In holding that this was error, the Minnesota Supreme
Court stated that such evidence would have shown the witness "as
having a strong interest in the prosecution and the outcome of the
prosecution and that he was the suitor, wronged to his face, harbor-
ing resentment, hostility, [and] injured feelings. . . .""I, When
used for this purpose it would seem that this evidence is necessary
for an adequate cross-examination of the witness. In Davis v.
Alaska, 170 which involved an attempt to impeach a key prosecution
witness by showing that his status as a juvenile probationer gave
rise to the possibility of bias or a motive to testify falsely, the United
States Supreme Court stated: "The partiality of a witness is subject
to exploration at trial, and is 'always relevant as discrediting the
witness and affecting the weight of his testimony.' "17 The Court
concluded that despite the state's important goal of protecting the
anonymity of juvenile offenders, the restriction on the defendant's
cross-examination of the witness denied him his constitutional right
of confrontation.
Applying the holding and rationale of Davis to those rape shield
statutes absolutely prohibiting the use of evidence of the complain-
ant's previous sexual activity to impeach the credibility of a witness
167. E.g., Motley v. State, 207 Ala. 640, 93 So. 508 (1922); State v. Elijah, 206 Minn. 619,
289 N.W. 575 (1940); Shoemaker v. State, 58 Tex. Crim. App. 518, 126 S.W. 887 (1910). See
generally 3A WIGMORE, supra note 21, at §§ 948-53 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
168. 206 Minn. 619, 289 N.W. 575 (1940).
169. Id. at 622, 289 N.W. at 577.
170. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
171. Id. at 316, quoting 3A WIGMORE, supra note 21, at § 940 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
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leads to the conclusion that those statutes will deny some rape
defendants their constitutional right to confront the witnesses
against them. Evidence offered to show the possibility of bias or
ulterior motive on the part of the complaining witness or any other
crucial witness for the state is necessary for an adequate cross-
examination of the witness. The only justifications for its exclusion
are protection of the complainant's privacy, which was expressly
rejected by the Court in Davis, and encouragement of the reporting
of rapes and prevention of the possibility of jury bias against the
complainant, both of which have been found insufficient to out-
weigh the interests of a criminal defendant.'72 Although using evi-
dence of the complainant's previous sexual conduct to show bias or
motive to testify falsely is not common, there will be cases in which
a rape defendant will offer such evidence to impeach the credibility
of the complainant or another crucial witness against him. If this
evidence is excluded, it is likely that he will be denied his right of
confrontation.
Those rape shield laws providing an exception for evidence of the
complainant's previous sexual conduct with the accused'73 are likely
to create problems in fewer cases than those absolutely prohibiting
the use of all evidence of the complainant's previous sexual conduct
for impeachment purposes, but they will still exclude evidence in
cases such as Elijah. Consequently, the operation of these statutes
will deny some rape defendants their constitutional right of confron-
tation. On the other hand, those rape shield statutes requiring the
trial judge to determine the admissibility of the evidence for im-
peachment purposes' are likely to create few constitutional prob-
lems if judges conscientiously consider the defendant's rights and
the holding and rationale of Davis. Under all of these statutes the
judge must find that the evidence is relevant to the issue of credibil-
ity of the witness, and under two of them he must find that the
probative value of the evidence is not outweighed by its prejudicial
or inflammatory nature.'75 It is submitted that the statutes that
expressly require the judge to engage in a balancing process can be
172. See notes 103-15, 140-41 supra & accompanying text.
173. See note 62 supra.
174. See note 63 supra.
175. ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.045 (Supp. 1975) (also requires the trial judge to consider the
probability that admission of the evidence will create confusion of the issues or unwarranted
invasion of the privacy of the complaining witness); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-9-26 (Supp.
1975).
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interpreted to require striking the balance in favor of the accused
and admitting the evidence tending to show bias or motive to falsify,
if necessary for an adequate cross-examination of a crucial witness.
So interpreted, all of these rape shield laws will allow the trial judge
to admit evidence of the complainant's previous sexual conduct
when necessary for an adequate cross-examination of a crucial ad-
verse witness, thus safeguarding the rights of the defendant in all
cases. "'76 In addition, the judge can exclude such evidence if it is not
necessary to insure the accused his right of confrontation, thus
achieving the state's goal of eliminating the possibility of jury bias
against the complainant. If the hearing is in camera,77 this proce-
dure also achieves the state's goals of protecting the privacy of the
complainant and encouraging the reporting of rapes in as many
cases as possible.
CONCLUSION
Undeniably statutes limiting the admissibility of evidence of a
rape complainant's prior sexual activity seek to achieve worthy
goals. Nevertheless, rape shield statutes that create a blanket exclu-
sion of such evidence, whether on the issue of consent, or to rebut
prosecution evidence, or to impeach the credibility of a witness for
the state, sometimes will deprive the defendant of his constitutional
right to a fair trial, or his right of confrontation, or both. A possible
solution to the dilemma created by these conflicting public policies
is a rape shield statute providing for a pretrial hearing to determine
the admissibility of evidence pertaining to the prior sex life of the
complainant. In order to protect the privacy of the complaining
witness, such a statute should require that the hearing be conducted
in camera. To protect the defendant's right to a fair trial and his
right of confrontation, the statute, at a minimum, should allow the
defendant to introduce evidence of the complainant's bad reputa-
tion for chastity and of prior acts of sexual intercourse with him if
such evidence is relevant to the case and critical to his defense or
necessary for an adequate cross-examination of a crucial adverse
176. Some problems might arise under the Iowa statute, IOWA CODE ANN. § 782.4 (Supp.
1976), because it prohibits the use of evidence of the complainant's previous sexual conduct
with men other than the defendant if it occurred more than one year prior to the date of the
alleged offense.
177. ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.045 (Supp. 1975); CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-407 (Cum. Supp.
1975); IOWA CODE ANN. § 782.4 (Supp. 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-9-26 (Supp. 1975)
(requires that the hearing be held in camera).
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witness. Such a statute would afford some protection from embar-
rassment for a complainant in a rape case and would eliminate any
possible jury bias against her caused by the disclosure in court of
evidence of her previous sexual conduct by preventing inadmissible
evidence from reaching the jury before its relevancy has been deter-
mined and by excluding such evidence when not critical to the
defense of the accused or necessary for an adequate cross-
examination of a crucial adverse witness. Although this procedure
does not provide complete protection to a rape complainant and
does not eliminate completely the possibility of jury bias against
her, such a procedure provides the maximum possible protection for
the victim consistent with a criminal defendant's constitutional
rights to a fair trial and to confront the witnesses against him.
